Barbarossa: Why such high Soviet Losses? – Explained

Barbarossa: Why such high Soviet Losses? – Explained


The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, led to a number of major defeats of the Red Army. Consequently, the Red Army suffered heavy losses in man and materiel. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht also had sustained considerable losses. “Operation Barbarossa exacted a huge toll on the German army with more men killed in July 1941 than in any other month of the war until December 1942.” Thus, the Red Army wasn’t a defenseless child, which begs the question: “what factors led to those high amount of losses?” But first, let’s look at the prewar situation. Following the problems of the Red Army during the Invasion of Poland, and especially during the Winter War, major reorganizations were set in motion. Additionally, the Red Army was also expanded quite significantly. This meant that new units were raised, existing units restructured, new equipment introduced, and many more actions. Now, as the Canadian psychologist Jordan B. Peterson put it very well recently, “One of the rules for making an organization is that it’s a lot easier to make a functional organisation worse than it is to make a dysfunctional organization better.” Thus, the major reorganization combined with a major expansion would have considerable impact, yet there were more problems. Namely, that the Soviet defensive line was moved forward in early summer 1941. The previous defensive line, the Stalin Line, was partially deconstructed and to be used in the new Molotov Line. Thus, “Soviet deployments in their first strategic echelon opposite Army Group Centre were set well forward, with only the most rudimentary of prepared defences and, owing to Stalin’s intransigence, received no warning of the impending invasion until it was literally underway.” Now, I’m aware that some people suggested Barbarossa was a preemptive war and, since my interest in that debate is extremely limited, I will quote from the most current assessment from an expert. Namely, Canadian military historian Alexander Hill who writes in his book on the Red Army from 2017, published by Cambridge University Press, “Although Suvorov’s suggestion that the Red Army was preparing for war against Germany in July 1941 is certainly untenable, given the evidence available, in 1941 the Red Army was undoubtedly mobilizing for war against Germany, just not a war in 1941. We can only speculate that in May 1941, when plans for a preventative strike against German forces massing on the border were considered, that Stalin deemed, in many ways correctly, that the Red Army was simply not ready for such an operation.” Now let’s look at the situation of equipment. Although the Red Army is often portrayed as a mass of men and material, this picture is certainly too simplified for the situation in 1941. Even though the Red Army possessed a large amount of tanks and other equipment, they were often outdated, in bad shape, not properly distributed, or simply lacking the proper support infrastructure. This had many reasons. One of them was that the Red Army focused a lot on acquiring more weapons, whereas transport vehicles were of lesser priority. Logistical problems were already encountered during the attacks on Poland and Finland, yet the production wasn’t shifted. For instance, the number of tractors necessary for transporting artillery was around 94 thousand, but in June 1941, only around 43 thousand were available, so about 45 percent. There was also a lack of ammunition, but the lack of fuel and lubricants was even worse. For instance, we have data for two tank divisions: the 33rd Tank Division had 15 percent of first grade petrol, four percent of automobile fuel, and zero percent of diesel; and for the 31st Tank Division, it was even worse. They had two percent of automobile fuel and zero percent of diesel. Considering also the huge logistical and supply problems with the Wehrmacht during Barbarossa, it seems in Soviet Russia one doesn’t have a logistical problem, but one IS a logistical problem. Yet another very crucial element was missing in the Red Army, namely communication equipment, especially radios. Even before the major expansion of the Red Army, there was a serious lack of it, and it didn’t get better. “As of first January, 1941, provision of the regimental
5-AK set had not reached 50 percent for the Red Army as a whole based on requirements upon mobilisation, and it was expected that only 57 percent provision would be achieved by the beginning of 1942.” So to summarize the pre-war situation, we can say that, “by early summer 1941, on the eve of the start of Operation Barbarossa, many units and formations of the Red Army that existed as meaningful combat-capable entities on paper only were sitting inadequately equipped, supplied, trained, and often undermanned in poorly prepared positions or camps along the Soviet western border, including the mechanised corps. As you can see, there were plenty of problems present. Now you can imagine what happens when you add the Wehrmacht, probably the most veteran and effective fighting force at that point in time. The German attack caught most of the units off-guard. Although many commanders near the front lines suspected a war, and sometimes even gave orders to increase combat readiness despite explicit orders from superiors not to do so, because Stalin and the senior leadership didn’t want to provoke the Germans. Thus, basically every warning of the imminent attack was ignored. Besides being off-guard, the Red Army had major issues with communication and reconnaissance. This situation was a result of many factors. As mentioned before, the Soviet units lacked radios and even telephones. In some regions in the first days of Barbarossa, communication systems broke down. This happened sometimes even without the attacks from the Luftwaffe, but also due to the fact that sometimes civilian infrastructure was used, and the networks were just overloaded. In some cases, the communication problem got worse, since after the initial phases, the Soviet headquarters weren’t static anymore. Another quite curious problem was that the Soviets actually encoded too much. Hill quotes an exchange that was intercepted by the Germans in the early morning of Barbarossa, when some still didn’t accept that the Germans were attacking. “We are being fired on, what shall we do?”, the response from the headquarters being, “You must be insane. And why is your signal not in code?” Yet, even in October 1941, when the Germans were deep into Soviet territory, the problems weren’t properly solved yet. “Indicative of poor Soviet reconnaissance and communications, as well perhaps of fear of being the bearer of terrible news or being seen to be responsible for it, was the fact that Stavka was not aware of deep German penetrations of Soviet lines until German forward elements were more than 100 km behind where the front line was supposed to be on fifth of October as encirclement loomed for so many units and formations.” As a result, the Soviets often didn’t know where the Germans were and even if they did know, they couldn’t coordinate their troops properly. Yet the Soviet leadership made this even worse because, for a very long time, Stalin and his commanders insisted on counterattacks. Numerous counterattacks. Yet one major issue with the “if in doubt, counterattack” approach: you need to know where to attack, or else you just drive up your tanks and can watch some trees or even worse, get ambushed. Considering that the Luftwaffe had, for the most part, air superiority, troop movement, especially with vehicles, was also dangerous. “Disorganised counterattacks by Soviet armoured forces blundered headlong into enemy units and anti-tank defences. As suggested by Kamentsev, a veteran of the first days of war, ‘during the early battles, we took terrible losses in tanks and personnel because of lack of knowledge of, and ability to conduct manoeuvre. We only knew one thing: forward!'” Yet even in September 1941, often such attacks were performed with understrength units and/or even untrained ones. For instance, in the 142nd Tank Brigade, many crews had no experience
operating their KV and T-34 tanks. Note that this behaviour changed over time. Around October, the Soviets used tanks in high concentration and also used ambushes more frequently. Another major problem besides the counterattacks were the “no retreat” orders, even if holding their ground made little sense. Probably the best example was the encirclement of
600 000 troops of Kiev in September 1941. Now most of you will know the stories of a few KV-1’s and KV-2’s delaying far larger German formations and shooting up loads of Panzers. Now those were usually isolated incidents, but they were isolated in two ways: first, usually conducted by a small number of tanks, and second, usually without any supporting arms like infantry, artillery, and/or airforce. In contrast, the Germans were leading in terms of combined-arms warfare. This also explains the anti-tank tactics for German infantry described in one of my earlier videos. Quite often, Soviet tanks attacked in small numbers and without infantry support. “During autumn of 1941, Soviet tanks were still, all too frequently, used not only in isolation from infantry support, but all other arms.” Now to wrap this up: although the Red Army suffered heavy losses in men and material during Barbarossa, the Red Army didn’t break as the German leadership had anticipated. And although the German successes seem decisive at first glance, they also came at a high price. Whereas the Red Army was losing mostly old tanks and unexperienced troops, the Wehrmacht was losing its best equipment, specialists, and veterans from previous campaigns. And since the Red Army didn’t break, the war turned into a war of attrition, yet Germany’s resources, manpower, logistical systems, and industry were not ready for such a war. “Of course, Germany was still capable of major offensives on certain sectors of the front and could achieve impressive successes at the operational level, but none of this could change the fundamental disparity between Soviet staying power and German offensive strength. As soon as Germany ceased to threaten a knockout blow and a longer, grinding war ensued, economic factors came into play which favoured the allied war effort even before the direct entry of the United States into the conflict.” This probably becomes more apparent if you look at the German summer offensives in 1941, 1942, and 1943: the width of the attack area decreased with each year considerably. As always, all sources are in the description. If you want to learn more about Barbarossa, check out this video about German blunders, or maybe you want to know more about Erwin Rommel. Then check out this video. Thanks to Bismark for helping me out on this video, and special thanks to my Patreons for financing two main sources for this video. Thank you for watching, and see you next time.

100 Comments on "Barbarossa: Why such high Soviet Losses? – Explained"


  1. Soviets treated their soldiers as fodder, poor bastards starved most the war and still had to fight.

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  2. There are books that go over day by day tactics used during operation Barbarossa and they show that the Sovets where not under equipped, all of their air bases where on the German border, all of their bombers where attack bombers and their tanks where mostly light tanks and the Germans only sized control of a fraction of the soviets military equipment which is surprising considering that if they where under equipped then the Germans would have captured all of the Soviet's military equipment.

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  3. The Fatherland Endures For a time Until its resources ran dry such as logistics, men, oil, food, etc. should of went straight for those resources for any chance for winning the wars & campaigns it fought in.

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  4. The german has a big chance to won the WWII if not the stupidity and foolishness of Adolf Hitler who made a wrong decision after the smolensk fall and during campaign of moscow.

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  5. USSR never really had much idea. Sheer weight of numbers won the day Russian lives count for nothing never have never will .this guy rambles on a bit😴👍😎

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  6. The answer is simple……both armies were organised for offensive operations..so which one was to attack 1st had a huge advantage…it happened to be Germany…if the soviet army was stationed for a defendive war the German progress would have been only a few miles

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  7. Why didn't they researched the effect of radio communication?
    Would it have had made any difference?

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  8. There is also the question of who controls the battle field after the battle. Many tanks were stopped in combat, engine damage, tracks broken, stuck in mud or otherwise immobilized but repairable. If you have control of the battle field, you can recover your tanks and put them back into service. If you do not, a tank with a broken track is a total loss, or worse, it is recovered by the enemy and used against you.
    I do not think that the Soviet Army had spent a lot of time on vehicle recovery and so they lost more tanks to the German Army than they would have otherwise.

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  9. The KVs were able to halt advances all by themselves until out of fuel and ammo. Slower than T34s.

    Impressive the Red Army survived 1941 with the 4 to 5 million they lost including equipment and the rich territory lost.

    41 Red Army Chaos

    42 Red Army learning

    43 Red Army applying

    44 Red Army consolidating

    45 Red Army dominating

    Those poor German kids in 44 and 44 no fucking chance. Al those kids in 42 at Stalingrad thinking one last battle and we have done it.

    God this theatre of war is stand alone brutal

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  10. long answer: this Video

    Short Answer:
    FOOOOL!
    GERMAN SCIENCE IS THE BEST IN THE WORLD!!!

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  11. It's because the Soviet Army was in an attack formation and not defensive. Russia was not far of invading Germany, Hitler just struck first.

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  12. Why German army have 900000 causilities in first 6 months of war? At the start of barborsa 3.3 million troops. In December 1941 just 2.4 million troops in Russia.

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  13. If you are seriously quoting Jordan Peterson as a source, I am logging out. (Sneer all you want, folks, Peterson is a big supporter of the INCEL movement. Byebye.

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  14. Sclerotic command, with poorly trained commanders. In addition, overwhelming fear of failure among commanders.

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  15. What about Suvorov's contention that the Soviets had massive weapons for offensive war such as tanks that could swim rivers and paratroops. Weapons that were unneeded for defensive war.

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  16. This is much ado about nothing. No country is/was ever prepared for war when you look at it in hindsight. Ever! A list of those who were NOT prepared for world War 2: Russia, France, UK, USA, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Japan, China, Germany … the list goes on and on. Germany attacked Russia using horse drawn mechanized infantry for God's sake. This same video will be published on the combatants of the next big war. Again, much ado about nothing.

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  17. Soviets was not on the defensive but on the offensive lines and that is the big difference. Numerically and technicaly soviets overhelmed nazis a lot, by means of radiocommunication as well. What they lack, was training, organization and a will to fight. That changed later into the war. And rifles, it really happened one rifle for several slodiers, not as a rule, but…

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  18. Most of the metal used in a rush and tank was the brittle type their manufacturing process was primitive at best

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  19. Because operation barbarossa was a preemptive strike. The russians massed their armies along the border. They were preparing to attack Europe. The attacking germans hit these staging areas. That is why they managed to destroy so many soviet armor, planes, guns. It was a surprise attack. They hit the soviets before they could start their invasion on Europe.

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  20. At the 2+ minute mark where the narrator quotes the Canadian historian about why Suvorov's contentions are false – it still does not answer the fact that the reds had: removed detonation charges from all bridges 'behind' their new forward line nor the massing of river gunboats on the Dneister River and along the entire land barrier with Germany. Doing so w.o. accounting for a potential strike by an enemy multiplies the potential defeat and capture of forward units deployed.

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  21. If Germans had stayed out of North Africa and just laid siege to Moscow and Stalingrad they would have beat Russians. I ran it through the simulator 5 times. I should have been there. This is how it should have went💣

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  22. Weird to see Jordan Peterson being cited on organizational psychology but that is his field. Not a fan of his politics but I’m sure his peer reviewed stuff is good. Interesting bit.

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  23. The Russians were socialists so they were a disorganized mess that was short of everything they needed!

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  24. Wether or not a soviet attack on Germany was truly ''imminent'- is irrelevant to determine the German leader's motivation to conduct a ''preemtive strike' against the soviet union. What matters to determine the true motivations of the war- is wether or not German leaders BELIEVED a soviet attack was imminent based on the information they had availble.

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  25. If Stalin had had the time to prepare, he would eventually have attacked Germany, whether Germany posed a threat or not. Similarly, Germany was going to attack the Soviet Union, whether it posed a threat or not, thus the debate over the idea of a preventative war is moot.
    And, it's glance, not glantz.

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  26. Nice! I loved the "Glantz" reference… I've read quite a few of his books concerning the War in the East…

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  27. The huge loss in NCOs during Stalin’s purges played a significant part.

    Non-commissioned officers are the backbone of any army and the RedArmy of 1941 was severely handicapped in this respect.

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  28. Looking at the casualty ratio, the Red Army in Barbarossa actually performed better than Poland or the French and British did in the early campaigns of the war.

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  29. Once again, so easily do Western historians dismiss "Suvorov" (Vladmir Rezun), whom was considered, when he defected, not necessarily a reliable asset, but later, once the Russian Federation opened many of its archive, was proved correct. They can't get it into their heads that Hitler had no better alternative to strike against Stalin in 1941, as the time to effect the catastrophic defeat necessary to win QUICKLY was slipping away.

    It should be kept in mind that Hitler lost about 2-3 weeks by having to campaign in the Balkans, though the relative price was low, at least until Crete – which proved to be the "death drop" of the Fallschirmjager. The paratroopers, and, most important, the many Ju52s and other aircraft lost in the Crete operation, which, though the objective was achieved, was considered at best a Pyrrhic victory, if not an outright defeat. This would prove critical, later on, when the Heer stood but 25 miles from the Kremlin, and could not go on due to "General Winter".

    What IF, instead of launching Barbarossa, though, with the very presence of the Red Army on some 1,200 miles of frontier, so, practically, there is ALREADY an Eastern Front, the bulk of the Heer must be deployed in East Prussia, Poland, and Romania (to protect the vital Ploesti oil fields) to preclude a Soviet strike, Hitler focuses on getting the UK out of the war? So, say Rommel gets another two panzer and two "light" divisions, and enough Luftwaffe assets are transferred to the Med to keep the Royal Navy and the RAF at bay? Could Rommel had rolled triumphantly into Cairo, and even rolled on upwards towards Palestine, assuming that the Brits haven't imprisoned the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem? Perhaps. Likely such a fight to the finish would still have to involve operations to take both Malta and Gibraltar, in order to inflict enough defeats to wear down the UK's will to continue the war. Along with that, Hitler has to take the war in the Atlantic more seriously in order to make the blockade of the British Isles effective. This means both asserting himself as C-in-C of the Wehrmacht to make both Goering and Donitz cooperate on Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine operations, which might have kept the Bismarck from being sunk on its maiden sortie. Also, the first "happy time" would have to be kept up with submarine production and crew training, but the Soviets holding the eastern shore of the Baltic past Memel doesn't give the KM much of safe training waters.

    And, even though Germany had the means to at least stymie British morale, likely effecting the downfall of the Churchill government, they didn't necessarily have the means to get the British to surrender, or even cower to any demands perceived as unreasonable. If the UK had agreed to a cease fire, it would have been simply to buy time to recover. Any negotiated settlement with Hitler would have certainly meant the withdrawl of the Kriegsmarine from the Atlantic, including their leaving the French Atlantic and Channel ports.

    And who is to say that with the UK out of the war that Stalin wouldn't be prompted to strike with the forces he had on hand, in order to preclude the Germans reinforcing their Eastern Front, with the war in the West concluded, or at least, temporarily put off? This is why Stalin would want to strike BEFORE the UK was forced out, and why Suvorov's assertions of a July 6, 1941 date for Operation "Groza" make sense. However, I doubt that date would have been met, more than likely, "Groza" wouldn't have happened before Sept. 1 of that year. If nothing else, the Soviets were anxious to get their new T-34 tanks to the forward units and get some training in, they knew that the Germans had no serious tank developments going beyond the Panzer III and IV series, also, even then, the Soviet manpower was critically needed for harvesting crops.

    As for Hitler, he knew that though a huge victory had been won in 1940 against France, German successes, as their military was primarily designed to wage a ground campaign, with even the vaunted Luftwaffe fairly much "flying artillery", and the Kriegsmarine but a token force compared to the version of itself that squared off against the Royal Navy off Jutland in 1916, stopped at the Channel. No matter what, the Swastika wouldn't ever be flying over Big Ben, but neither did the Brits have the means to really take the war to Germany, at least not for years, and without the Americans, they'd have to turn to the Soviet Union. Logically, it was the Soviet Union that in 1941 posed the greatest threat, but also the best possible circumstances existed to eliminate the threat. So it made complete sense for Hitler to strike before Stalin did, and WOULD. Hence why Barbarossa should be considered "preemptive", but not in the sense of having detected an imminent attack and taking action, but rather, in the overall strategic sense.

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  30. Even IF the Wehrmacht had reached the “A-A line” (the operational goal of Barbarossa), I think it’s still uncertain and likely doubtful they would have defeated the USSR.
    Why?
    1. About 1/2 of the Soviet’s military industry was located east of the Urals.
    2. The USSR still had a massive population advantage, and had already called up millions of reserves.
    3. What would the Germans’ next step have been? They couldn’t advance through the Urals, AND seize the Caucuses, AND pacify partisan resistance from Belarus to the Eastern Front (to name a few of the pressing strategic concerns facing the 3 army groups).
    As you say, Russia IS a logistical problem…for which the Wehrmacht has no realistic solutions.

    Had Hitler read more Tolstoy and less Goethe, he might have realized this fact before he launched the operation.

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  31. Viktor Suvorov icebreaker Read this , thanks me later if the book still exist my copy is from 90's

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  32. In the Front they were fucked by the krauts, im the back by the NKWD. Ási de simple pinche puta cabrónes.

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  33. Happens when you tell your soldiers to charge 9 German mg-42s in the open and if you run away we will shoot you with our machine guns 😂

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  34. I wanna believe the Jordan B Peterson quote was a joke, since it was essentially "it's easy to make a good thing bad but hard to make a bad thing good", which sums up Jordan "Tidy your room" Peterson's level of philosophy quite well.

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  35. There is one fact that so many history pundits overlook. What distinguishes soldiers apart is training, expertise, experience that makes a veteran of war but the difference between a raw recruit, a trained troop, and an experienced veteran. When the Nazis invaded Soviet Russia in 1941, as time went on the German losses were not just in simple numbers of men, but of trained experienced veterans of Poland and France, etc. Loosing these troops we’re irreplaceable to the German war machine. It really showed in the Luftwaffe. Most German aces flew till injuries stopped them or they were dead. Eric Hartman was the all time Ace with 251 kills. American pilots were rotated out, sent back to give raw recruits a hands on teaching of air tactics. When the Germans lost a veteran pilot, they lost irreplaceable experience.

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  36. The russian losses were due to their offensive positioning at the start of the war. Later it was driven primarily by the better training of the german troops and staff. However the russians were content to trade lives for time and ultimately won what turned from blitzkrieg to a war of attrition.

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  37. Barbarossa was a preemptive strike. I suggest study by russian Mark Solonion basically confirming Suvorow and much more.

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  38. Russia was in attack mode they have planed to conquer Germany 2 weeks later we have many luck to attack them first. Because when they have attack once they have rush us with this attack germany dont lose instantly

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  39. So the Soviets were badly prepared for the efficient Wermacht yet they still beat the the Germans. Lol.

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  40. Has nothing to do with reality. Classic West Myths 🙂 In particular, endless counterattacks were the right decision; firstly, the best (tank) units of the Germans were detached from the infantry and suffered heavy losses from counterattacks; secondly, counterattacks forced the Germans to slow down and wait for the infantry, which gave time to tighten reserves and create new lines of defense for soviets. The author actually read one book in his life and believes that he knows something. Gggg

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  41. Re Soviet attack plans, consider the 1939 pact. Stalin probably expected England and France to be at war with Germany following the invasion of Poland. Any reason expectation was that to be a tough slog resulting in all parties being exhausted after 1-2 years. This gave him perhaps 3 years to get ready. The T-34 entered service in 41, with good numbers in 42. Base experience in the Finland war, 43 would be better, but 42 was doable. In all Stalin’s was almost Machiavellian perfection, only to be ruined when the frog rolled over quickly.

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  42. Typical ruSSians THEY ARE like the arsonist playing the fireman….When it comes to most things…

    BUT when it comes to WW2 they are the embodiment of the definition of the phrase…. arsonist playing the fireman.!

    1. First, they start ww2 together with Hitler in 1939

    2, Then in 1941 they act like victims when they have a falling out with their old buddy hitler…

    3. Then they act and present them selfs as liberators when the allied forces defeated hitler's evil in 1945 the same evil war together with Hitler the ruSSians them selfs, instigated and helped Hitler to unleashed unto the rest of the world…

    4. Then the RuSSians try to hide the historical facts of their evil acts and the facts they were collaborators and was working together with Hitlers nazi Germany, And how do they do this they just smokescreen the facts and claim that WW2 started in 1941 and not even calling it WW2 but renaming it to the Great Patriotic War…

    THE FACTS

    1. Hitler and Stalin together attack Poland on September 1, 1939 fin September 17, 1939, from the east in accordance with the pact with Stalin's Buddy Hitler

    2. Stalin attacks the Baltic States on September 25, 1939

    3 Stalin's secret orders of how to deal with opposition in Baltics

    4 The Katyn Massacre September 17, 1939

    5 Soviet and nazi-collaboration 1939

    In Moscow in August of 1942, Churchill asked Stalin how he had come to sign the pact with Hitler in 1939. Stalin replied that he thought that England must be bluffing; he knew that Britain had only two divisions that could be mobilized at once, and he thought that Britain must know how bad the French Army was and what little reliance could be placed on it. He could not imagine that Britain would enter the war with such weakness.

    On the other hand, he said he knew Germany was certain ultimately to attack Russia. He was not ready to withstand that attack; by attacking Poland with Germany he could make more ground, the ground was and is equal to time, and he would consequently have a longer time to get ready. However, none of this was true. To Stalin himself and most Party functionaries, the pact was not a necessity, but a highly congenial alliance.

    Probably Stalin's most successful propaganda coup of all was the propagation of the myth that Soviet territorial acquisitions in 1939 were designed to establish a forward strategic line in case of a German attack.

    This tale has received wide acceptance, but eighteen months later when Hitler launched his invasion, virtually nothing had been accomplished in the way of fortifications, defensive lines or military airfields to exploit ground gained by the nazi-soviet Pact.

    In fact, the national armies of Finland, Romania, and the Baltic States would have protected Stalin's flanks. As it was, Finland and Romania were turned into effective allies of the Germans, and the Baltic States provided Hitler with excellent troops.

    Hitler gained a great deal from the pact. The Soviet Union was supplying him with his raw materials. Provision was made for the supply from Russia of a million tons of grain for cattle, 900,000 tons of mineral oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons of phosphates, 100,000 tons of chrome ore, 500,000 tons of iron ore, 300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron, and numerous other commodities vital to the German war effort. and all this when inside of the ruSSian controlled USSR other nations like Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia people were starving in extreme poverty…

    While Hitler was fighting Britain and France, the Soviet Union was supplying him with his raw materials. Not only that, but they were helping Hitler to break Britain's blockade by supplying rubber and other essential supplies by transporting them on the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is interesting to note that while Stalin was supplying Hitler with thousands of tons of grain, his own people were starving.

    It is very clear that what both Hitler and Stalin wanted was the complete dismemberment of Poland. Polish soldiers held captive in the Soviet Union were told that "…by being on good friendly relations with Germany the land would never again be an independent country. Poland is dead forever." Stalin furnished Germany with military co-operation far beyond that which the United States was giving Britain at that time. The German navy was allowed facilities at Murmansk on a scale which contrasts favorably in many ways with restrictions placed on Allied use of the same port between 1941 and 1945.

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  43. If it wasn't for the US & Allies, Russia would have collapsed in less than a year after Germany invaded them..
    the US supplied Russia with everything from socks & boots to Tanks & oil with The Lend-Lease plan..
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

    Japanese army was more fierce than the Russians & The Germans… The Russians would surrender right away, the Japanese would fight to the end and then kill themselves first..

    Remember that the Russians have fought the Japanese for decades and the Japanese always defeated the Russians.

    The Germans were easier to defeat than the Japanese…. The US defeated the more than 2 million Germans in North Africa, Italy, Sicily and France in a matter of months on each one…. Japan was a whole different ball game..

    It took the Russians 4 years to expel the Germans from Russia and it was mainly due to the help of the US & allies..

    The Russians only had to fight the Germans, The US had to fight the Japanese Empire, The Italians & The Germans..

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  44. The Red Army lost 24,000 tanks, assault gun and tans destroyers in 1944 as well so it wasn't just Barbarossa.

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  45. Вообще-то нет. Основываясь по данным разведки. Верховное командование каждый раз давала команду на боевую готовность, но если нападения не происходило, то давалась команда отбой. Источников предупреждавших о нападении было много и с разными датами. Реагировать надо было на каждое донесение. Некоторые командиры на границах начинали даже игнорировать приказ, но при этом отчитываясь о готовности. Сталин всегда знал, что война с нацисткой Германией неминуема.

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  46. Because Stalin liquidated the entire officer corps including the main originators of Red Army doctrine. Of course from his point of view that was necessary. It would have been really bad for him if they were Trotskyists.

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  47. Land Lease provided exactly what was needed, trucks, fuel, radios … the question is not why there were large losses in 1941 but why the Russians got so much better in 42/43. The answer is Land Lease.

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  48. Right before the war Stalin had hundreds of high ranked soldiers executed because he was afraid they would conspire against him (source is a book from Will Fowler). So basically all of the Soviet Unions soldiers had no experienced leaders. This is also one of the main reasons why they lost so many men during invasion of Finland.

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