Discussion #3: Economic Growth, with Robert Skidelsky

Discussion #3: Economic Growth, with Robert Skidelsky


(energetic music) – What do you think? What do you think about, let’s just take three
stories as a starting point. This was the agenda of economics. It was to inquire into
the causes of growth. And these are the stories
economists have told about growth, roughly speaking. Do they raise any problems for you? – I think in terms of
the neoclassical view, the state or public
expenditure is inefficient compared to private expenditure,
is, I disagree with that. Because if you, as you said, if you look at the
United States, arguably, the United States military
is one of the best development of technology
which is then used for the private sector. If you look at the iPhone, the GPS, the other apps on that
come from the US military. And I think a lot of
innovations actually come from state companies
and state expenditures rather than private sector. – But is the argument
that they would’ve come, I mean there could be
two counter arguments. One is that they would’ve come anyway. And it’s immaterial that investment came from one source rather than another. The second is, they might not have come, but then they won’t need it, really. They were artificial, in a way. There would’ve been other developments. The investment would’ve
gone into other areas. And maybe we wouldn’t
have had all these things, but we would’ve had other things. So in fact some advantage,
there was some opportunity costs in making those investments. I mean that could be another argument. What we have isn’t necessarily what was, we should’ve had if we’d allow the market. – I suppose my kinda
argument is sorta along the lines of Ha-Joon Chang that we should look at the historical, and not sort of think about
these alternative histories. And that our history
provides one of the best sort of point of analysis for
making choice of our future. So if we know that this
kind of partnership has worked in the past, it’s
a very good starting point for positive description for the future. My argument is that because these things have happened in the past that it’s, and they’re proven to work, we should take special
attention to it, essentially. – What, is it, are you
saying that we shouldn’t pay attention to history, or we should? – No, I’m saying–
– We should. – Yeah, basically using–
– We should. – Yeah, Ha-Joon Chang is like,
you should look at history. – Well, I agree, absolutely. I start with this sort of
bias in favor of history, because after the first,
my first discipline. So I still tend to look at economic theory in historical frameworks. Which means that I attach
quite a lot of importance to their contingency,
and don’t think of them as absolute truth valid at
all times and all places. And I tend to look at them
in the context of structures of one kind or another,
which give rise to them. So in that sense, I’m
very much on the side of looking at history. But nevertheless, is there
something valid outside history in the free trade or in
the neoclassical story or in the Adam Smith’s story? You see, Adam Smith, he
does recognize something that is obviously important. That economic growth is promoted
by trade and accumulation. Those are his two points. And I don’t think anyone has
ever disputed that ever since, given that you’re
committed to growth agenda as a way of enabling mankind
to escape from poverty. Those are the two things you need to do. Now, what people have
argued about ever since is how you organize those two activities. Whether they are best left to be generated by a market system, or to what extent they’re best left to be
generated by a market system. And how can, and whether
they can be organized in some other way. Now that’s, I think,
being the area of dispute. And I think what economists,
mainstream economists would say is that their propositions are scientific. Whereas others would say,
Adam Smith starts by saying these are the two things necessary. We can’t leave it to the state. It has to be done by the market. At which point someone might say, well, there’s the ideology coming in. It’s invading the scientific
analysis of the problem. And that’s where historical contingency or structural features
come into the story. Because Adam Smith cannot
conceive of a state capable of developing the
kind of trade relations and the type of accumulation
necessary for economic growth. – About the (mumbles)–
– Yeah? – Well, he obviously
didn’t approve of the state and the mercantilist state that he was observing at his time. But nevertheless, he mentioned,
he made it the state’s responsibility to make
sure that this sort of concentration of specific type of interest wasn’t reproduced, and so
the state still maintains as well as defending the market, not only in defensive outside, from outside the nation state. So the state still plays a central role. But as sort of in a neoliberal senses, protector and creator of the market. – Yeah, well, okay. What’s the role of the
state in Adam Smith? And what, is it the same
role in neoclassical thought? There are two views of Adam Smith. One is that he’s an
apostle of Laissez-faire and that is sort of summed up by quotation I gave earlier on. The other is that he
actually gave the state quite substantial duties, which could be extended even. For example, he obviously
made it the provider of law and order and defense
and security systems. He also gave it specific tasks which would now come under
the heading of public goods. And one of them was education. But the other was infrastructure. And we were talking earlier
about the railways, the canals. In Adam Smith state, there weren’t any railways, roads and canals. So there were those duties. But he gave it, apart from those sort of bits of infrastructure, there were no other investment duties. And he also thought the state
didn’t need much revenue. He thought most of the,
the state in his day was a great stealer of remedy, of revenue, and it, the ruling clause, which
comprise the state, which was the landlord
clause, lived off rents. And so he did, he attacked
the mercantile estate. It was bloated. It was inefficient for that reason. It stole, it stole wealth
from the merchant class, from the business class, who’d be able to use it more productively. I think that was still the thrust of him. And you’re right, he’s
not as Laissez-faire as sometimes his followers make out to be. But by the time you get into
the neoclassical system, I think the states, now what do we think of the states duties in
neoclassical thinking? – I mean, it’s generally
considered to be something that should stay out of the markets, and that’s about it. The markets are the most
efficient determinants of utility, and utility kind of comes to the floor, like you said at the very beginning. And I think, like you also said, the divorce of wellbeing from economics is something that’s very
relevant in this question and the role of the
state, because the state, in my opinion, if you
can’t tell from my accent, I’m American, is still very relevant, very important, and you
can just take a look, for example, at the sorts of innovations, research, development, et cetera, that’s been done with significant
state support in the US. So like you look at NASA
in the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, the sorts of things that
they were doing and creating. We literally put people on the moon. And now, as the US research paradigm is sort of shrinking, stepping back, the government is not funding nearly at the levels that it has been. And we’re getting things like Uber, and we’re getting things like Airbnb, and it’s essentially,
you might be innovating and playing around a little
bit with existing technology, but in terms of significant advances in technologies that are
essential to our well being, those really aren’t happening. And I mean, you can debate
me all you would like about how essential Uber
may be to your wellbeing, but I don’t think it’s
quite on par with like, for example, here in England, in the UK, with the creation of the NHS. And that major innovation
in the postwar era. – Yeah, yeah, exactly. But you see, I think, I
think it would be wrong to say that neoclassical
economics had nothing to say about state intervention
outside the market. I think it, in principle,
it couldn’t intervene as much as it wanted outside the market. It must interfere with
market processes that– – But then what is outside the market? – Well, for example,
distribution might be, in sort of tax system. You sorta, you allow
market prices to be set by, in market activities, but you then, but you might want to tax the rich, have a progressive tax
system to redistribute. That would be outside the market. You’re not interfering
with the determination of market rewards. That neoclassical economics did, did have a lot of influence on the development of the welfare state in the early 20th century. It didn’t in the end, because
it didn’t win the argument, but there were economists arguing from a neoclassical point of view, their arguments being based on a declining marginal utility of money. That you should actually
transfer money from the rich to the poor in order to
increase total utility. So they were arguing, they
were making that argument. But in the end, it didn’t win. It didn’t win out within the profession. You had a declining
support for redistribution. Which is being obviously manifested in the emasculation of wealthy
states in the last 30 years. – Regarding the trade
theory of Adam Smith, obviously that’s based
on specific assumptions that Adam Smith kind of had in mind. So there’s this whole kind
of beaver for deer theory that I don’t know how
much evidence there is that actually that used to be how humans in primitive societies used to trade. So that’s one assumption
that he came up with on which further
assumptions were then made. And then going back to the
Ricardian free trade theory as well, it is also based
on specific assumptions which could have had its
place at Ricardian time, but obviously things
have changed since then. We have now movement of
labor as well as capital and the other kind of
assumptions that were based that may not be valid anymore. This is one point. And then I wanted to just go back to what we’ve just been
talking about state. The role of state in the
neoliberal, during neoliberalism. And I would argue that it has a huge role. And in a way, the kind of
extreme of neoliberalism is authoritarianism, because
without state control, without state intervention, neoliberalism wouldn’t be able to exist. All these policies that we currently have have to be implemented by the state. They don’t happen naturally. As you said, taxation, for example, or favoring business friendly environment. They’re all kind of conditions
that have to be made. And even current nationalism,
favoring of markets based on precarious employment which employs mostly people
who are working illegally or not, or who are
vulnerable in some ways, and kind of maintaining
this pool of people who are being exploited in favor
of markets and the economy. So the role, the state plays a huge role in maintaining the rules to
stay like that for these people, so that to keep the market,
these specific markets in the way that benefit big countries. Even here in London, London
relies on foreign cleaners. If there were no foreign cleaners, London probably collapse tomorrow. And the state dictates the
rules for these cleaners that then contribute to the economy. So obviously the state plays a huge role in terms of how– – But their country say
that the state just simply creating the conditions for more perfect market integration. After all, if our globalization is about
economic integration, and I was creating a global market, which is the ideal of a
neoclassical economists, or free trade, if you like. Although free trade is always, they haven’t always accepted that you need free capital movement. If you get the whole way
in the neoclassical agenda, then you have all three, don’t you? You have free movement of goods, you have free movement of labor, and you have free movement of capital. And that is actually
what the European Union is committed to. And it is, it is an ever
more perfect market system. Now, if you have your problem
that the market clearing wage as a result of free
movement is considered below the standards acceptable for
any particular group of people, then the argument always is that you then intervene outside the market. You don’t interfere with the
market clearing wage itself by say, insisting on minimum wages, but you compensate them
from outside the market. That is the classical argument, I think, which a humane neoclassical economists would support, wouldn’t he? And many of the interventions of the state in favor of particular groups
wouldn’t be supported by, couldn’t be defended much
by neoclassical economics. I think neoclassical economists might be against a lot of them. They would say that you have
a lot of actual state policy is a kind of mercantilist policy, which they would be against. – Yeah, but I think there’s a difference between talking about no role of the state and obviously active role of the state in maintaining these policies. So, I mean, private companies continue to have to be
bailed out by governments, and that’s where the
government play an active role in supporting the economy, essentially. Because these companies,
they are too big to fail and too big to jail, even. – Yeah, but of course,
neoclassical economists would tend to, or the ones I’ve talked to, often would tend to say, well,
you shouldn’t bail them out. And the only reason you
have to bail them out is that they were allowed to establish monopolistic positions
of one kind or another, by government, by legislation, supporting it or not being
toughen up against it. That’s why they became too big to fail, and that’s why you then
have to bail them out. That kind of situation
represent gross imperfections and distortions in the market. And the problem with those arguments is you always seem to
feel they’ve got some, economists have some ideal
situation always in their minds. And they regret very very much all the imperfections that
they perceive around them. They want to get rid of them somehow. And yet, you also know
that those imperfections are pretty integral to
the way any system works. So that the utopia of mainstream
economics, it is a utopia. It’s never going to be realized. Therefore, you have to deal
with things as they are. And therefore you have to have, your models have to have some
element of realism in them, which of course, they don’t. – I mean, that seems to have, that idea seems to have an
inherent contradiction in it by saying that the states
allowed the markets to operate as they would, and the
markets produced a monopoly, and therefore, the state
should’ve been intervening actively to prevent the monopoly because the markets
don’t operate perfectly. And there’s no real
addressing of the underlying, well, what were the market conditions that allowed this monopoly to arise if the markets were operating without proper state intervention. Are you saying that
states need to intervene to keep markets going properly? And I just can’t quite square with, I feel like the neoliberal positions on market intervention
could be very inconsistent. – I agree, I agree with that. On the one hand, you have the proposition, if markets were perfectly competitive, such and such and such would be the case. Then you say, but without interference, they would be perfectly competitive. That is the prescriptive element. They could be made perfectly competitive. And then their benefits would be realized. But of course, they can’t be
made perfectly competitive. That’s, competitive market
is a purely ideal structure. It’s a mental construct by economists. There never were such things, and there never could be such things. It’s something I’m going to talk about a bit in my next lecture, which is what do economists
mean by equilibrium. There’s always this idea that
there’s some optimality there which if you could only remove
these interferences, would, would result and would carry humankind more rapidly to the point of bliss. I think that the confusion
between explanation, between description,
explanation, and prescription, runs all the way through
these mental constructs that economists use. And it’s very very hard to avoid, it’s very very hard to sort it out when you’re thinking about it, because people very easily
slide from one to the other. What do you think would be the case? What do you think would happen? And maybe history can
give us some inclination, some insight into it. What do you think would happen
if there wasn’t a state? Would markets develop and be efficient? – Well, I would say that markets weren’t existing anymore,
because of the state, if you read also the pages
written by Karl Polanyi, actually has a very active role in shaping and creating markets. So not only setting the rules, but also giving a direction
to economic growth, also not only economic
growth, but development, because also, there
should be, in my opinion, a distinction to be made
between these two concepts, growth and development. – Good, what distinction? What is the distinction you would make? – Well, probably, I would look at the, not only the quantitative
aspect of growth, but only on qualitative sides. If you think about, you
previously asked the question, was globalization or either free trade, did it help to raising living standards? Something that is not figuring
into economic discussions about growth is precisely
living standards. And I think mostly because
they’re actually difficult to measure, while there
were some tentatives like the human development index developed by the United
Nations, but it’s not really widely adopted and we
still have to struggle with the concept of the GDP
that anyway is evolving. In a way, that is accounting
for different stuff. But still the economy is growing even faster their country
rules are evolving. So we’re still stuck, as economists, we’re still discussing and debating about quantitative concepts, leaving aside the qualitative ones. And perhaps, this is also
because political economy became just economics,
that is to say ruling out political arguments, but also ruling out the interdisciplinary
nature, if we want to say, or characteristic of studying the economy. This to say, being also
aware that there are such discipline such as
sociology, anthropology, history, and even philosophy, that should probably be
part of the economist’s, let’s say, education. – Yeah, I agree with that, but still, don’t you think that it is valuable to just keep in mind the
definition of Marshall? That economics is
concerned with the material prerequisites of wellbeing? That means that there
are other prerequisites of wellbeing that are not material. But economics is concerned
with the measurable bits. And not with anything else. And isn’t one of the, one of the problems with human wellbeing indexes, that they mix up measurable
and unmeasurable things and then have to, then have to weigh them in a quite arbitrary way. I’m quite in favor of
restricting our inquiry, the inquiry of economics
to material things. ‘Cause I think beyond that, they’re not competent to say anything, actually, as economists, really. But what they, well, I’m not sure I agree with what I’ve
just said, actually. (students laughing) They should be competent to say something. Because that, the purpose,
because they have to answer the question, what, why should you be interested in alleviating poverty? If you can’t give an answer except to say, well, it’s better that people should have more things to eat than less, why? Beyond starvation, that is. Why, why should it be better? Provided people have
enough material requisites. You also come to the end of your inquiry. And yet you feel you should be going on to consider how these
material prerequisites relate to other bits of
life, other bits of welfare. And that’s where I find there’s a gap. And the only way most people can bridge it in their own minds is just to keep on a certain track in which you go on increasing
the material prerequisites without actually asking
what they’re for any longer. And I think that’s the
treadmill we’re on, all of us. – It’s, I would agree with that, and I think that the problem of economics just focusing on GDP is
that without being sure about its underlying
aims for promoting GDP, such as making people happier and enabling them to devote their life to what they consider most important and live a fulfilled life, then you can become very
narrow minded and say, look, we’re just interested in high GDP. But you could have a
society where their GDP is extremely high and
they’re all very miserable, working very hard and very
competitive and jealous. And you could have another society where people are very happy,
but their GDP is quite low. And without going a bit deeper in terms of your study
of what you’re actually aiming for in economics
and what the principles are underlying the study,
then it’s not possible to evaluate those two societies. You’re just looking at GDP. So I think that is really important. And I also wanted to say
with respect to the earlier question about how markets
would manage without the state. I think that neoclassical
economics assumes that state intervention
in markets is something that’s rarely required,
occasionally, if needed, but generally markets would
be fine by themselves. But actually, I think the
way things tend to work in markets is that, one,
and this is a point made by Karl Marx, that one
firm tends to get bigger than the others, or a few
firms tend to get bigger, and then they either join forces, or the smaller one dissolves, ’cause it can’t compete
with the bigger firm. And so actually, the way the
markets naturally tend to move is towards a monopoly situation. And you see that a lot today. There’s loads of companies which if you investigate a bit more carefully, they pretend to be different companies, but actually there’s just one or two or three companies producing the goods. For example, Innocent smoothies
is owned by Coca Cola, and I don’t know what other companies Coca Cola owns, but you think
there’s different companies competing in a market based way, but actually, there’s
some kind of monopoly that’s hidden there. So I think that actually the state is required to maintain a healthy market, because without it, the
movement of competitive markets tends to go towards monopoly. – Yeah, well, it’s all, that all seems to be very true, which, but of course then you have
the question of the conditions under which efficient markets can occur. And there, the state obviously
does play a huge role. And my feeling is that if
you didn’t have states, you would just have criminality. And of course you have
a lot of criminality even with states, because some states are simply criminal
organizations themselves. We can all think of them. But without, without
states, you would just have criminal activities. And eventually, you see,
I think the argument might be that eventually you do get order coming out of criminality,
because criminality’s intolerable as a condition of life for people and they will then take
some steps to limit it. And I think that’s the basis of all social contract theory, really, isn’t it? At some point, they,
people decided that life without a state was too nasty, brutal, brutish and short, and set
up a state to protect them. Which is a fiction, but it’s a fiction that is related to how people thought of the market system developing as well. People often thought that
the self regulating aspects of the market developed
fairly spontaneously out of the problems created
by unregulated markets. In other words, the markets developed their own systems of regulation. I think that is one of
the main contentions of people who’ve studied
the development of markets. Out of the great fairs of medieval Europe or great fairs of the edged world, you had, they had their own
policing systems, they had– – Guilds.
– Yes, all those sort of, and watch?
– The guilds. – The guilds. There were always these
sort of elements of order within the markets. And I think neoclassical economists have tended to build on that and say, look, we have here a
self-regulating system that if it’s not interfered with too much, maybe of course, kept honest
by outside interferences to some extent, it will
deliver the goods we want. Which is to rescue humanity from poverty and produce the material
prerequisites of wellbeing. And so that’s where we’re stuck. I think in our thought, the state is both a plus and a minus. Some people emphasize the minus aspects and I think that’s true of
most neoclassical economists. They, heir to the tradition of the state being wasteful, corrupt, predatory. And then there are others
who emphasize the plus, the advantage, the importance of the state in making a market system possible. – I was wondering about
that because you mentioned that the mainstream story
is the story of free trade, of comparative advantage. But if we look at Japan
or other Asian tigers, if they would’ve stuck with
their comparative advantage, they would’ve still
produced agricultural goods. And so the story of the structuralist view of moving up the ladder,
there’s developmental state, and moving beyond agricultural sector to the manufacturer sector
and then to other sectors, I was wondering how do free
trade or neoliberal economists look at that, how do they
explain the growth of Japan and other Asian countries,
because they did not stuck to their original comparative
advantage but moved along. – Well, there was a big debate about this. And I don’t know where it’s got to because I sort of read a lot
about it 15 or 20 years ago. There is an argument
that they should’ve stuck to their comparative
advantages, and that they, the idea that you put lots of resources into developing a product
that will only actually help you in 15 or 20 years, your, there’s a huge
opportunity cost there. You could actually be putting those resources into things that, say, where your comparative advantage lies, which produces more accumulation for you, over, than investing in
things which only give you your advantage somewhere along the road. There is that argument. You are obviously
investing in the long term. You’re actually sacrificing something that you could be making
in the short term. – But then I think the argument is that if you only stick with your
original comparative advantage, you stuck, you’re stuck with
that product or that sector and can’t move beyond that. – Why? – Because you will keep
focusing on the short term and your revenues that you currently have and you won’t invest in things that you will only benefit
from 15 or 20 years later. – Well, yeah. Is that right? If–
– I certainly think so. I think that brings up a big, a good point about path dependency. If Japan has moved all their resources over to something other
than they in fact did, then as those other sectors
would decline and contract, it’s very, it’s sort of
pretty much impossible for them suddenly to
transfer all those resources and capital back to those other sectors. And so that’s again within
the sort of historical perspective, I think that’s
important to consider. – But I mean, if you concentrate on, if you concentrate on
your existing advantages, that is the source of
maximizing your profits. And those are the, those
profits will enable you to, they will raise your income and raise the rate of accumulation. – I think that’s again,
another distributional issue of where those profits
are actually going to. – Yeah, if we’re able to actually effectively marshal them into
the process of learning and, I mean this is that Heckscher-Ohlin model, and essentially like you
have to be able to learn and to bring a little bit of the
political element back in in the current international system, we’ve got patents on everything. Intellectual property
law is growing stricter and stricter by the day, and it’s becoming more and more difficult, for example, what China has done
over the past 20 years. Yes, they’ve been
manufacturing everything, but they’ve also been
learning how to design and create it in the first place, and so now they’re able to natively design and create and develop their own products that are just as technologically advanced as those that are designed in Silicon Valley by Apple or by Google. And that’s becoming less of a possibility, and so even if you have a
sudden accumulation of wealth and resources, if you
can’t really marshal it to improve your
technological capabilities, it’s, you’re going to wind up essentially squandering it, because
eventually after a while, everyone succumbs to temptation. If you’re sitting on suddenly
a windfall of $10 million and you try and try to
figure out what to do with it and finally you just realize
you can’t do anything with it, well, you might as well just
waste it on buying sports cars or giving really elevated
or inflated salaries to your closest friends, so on so forth. That’s not to say that
these are necessarily all perfectly virtuous
countries to begin with, but it’s definitely an issue. And there’s definitely an element of trying to keep, in my opinion, keep sort of the periphery,
developing countries, out of the game and prevent this access. And that’s an additional
thing to overcome. And so I think that really reinforces these elements of path dependency. – Yeah, I agree. And I think, I think where
you have a competition with equal technology but unequal labor. Then there’s a good
argument for protection. Because I think obviously if
technology is widely diffused, but labor costs are unequal
among the competitors, then the cheap labor locations will swap the
more expensive ones. Because you have equal technology. I think the assumption behind some of these earlier theories, because capital was
supposed to be immobile, technology was not transferred readily from between the competitors. Now that it is, then maybe some, I think it’s very interesting actually, that Ricardo himself hoped that capital would remain immobile. He didn’t just think of
it as a fact of his time. But he said, “I hope owners
of capital in England “will be patriotic enough to be content “with a more modest profit at home “than seeking maximum profit abroad.” He actually said that. And you don’t expect that
from someone like Ricardo, but that thought has long
since vanished from economics. You try to maximize your
profits wherever you can. – And I think that introduces another, another area where the state and what its role should be is important. It’s a question that needs to be decided, because when you have these capital flows, if the capital flows turn exploitative, what redress do these states have to try and gain damages. For example, even if they can, essentially you’ve got, like for example, with specifically financial capital flows and the ways that they
can slip into a country, heat up a market, get immediate returns and then slip right back
out and cause collapses. How do you regulate that? How do you deal with that? How do you prepare for that? As a market, as a state,
as an economy overall? – Yeah, well now look, I think
we’ve covered this ground quite well, but just to sum up, what do you think economics, what do you think, we’ve
got two definitions of the economics problem. One, with some of you were here yesterday, where you simply think of
it as an allocation problem and workout the most
efficient system of allocation of a given set of
resources at any one time. And the second is you are
interested in trying to secure the growth of those resources. Which doesn’t mean that
you’d give up the efficiency, but that you have it move,
the economy moves over time from undeveloped with
the right organization, develops more resources
to satisfy human wants. Now those are the two
functions of economics as suggested by economic,
economists themselves. This is what economics is for. How far should the increase
of resources be carried? How far should economists
think of themselves as being responsible for things
like improving the wealth of increasing the wealth
of their societies? Or does their responsibility stop at a point when people have sufficient of the material
prerequisites for wellbeing? At which point economists say, okay, well it’s up to others to talk
about the purposes of life, the end, what the human
drama is all about. And we can retire, having done our job. Is there anything permanent
or immortal about economics in relation to the human condition? Is it always needed? Or is it just there for
a particular purpose? To get capital accumulation going and sufficiently wide markets to enable growth to take place? And once it’s done that, do we need, do we need economics any
longer as a discipline? Which doesn’t mean that
economic reasoning won’t be, won’t be relevant in all
kinds of practical problems. Thinking like an economist for many many purposes is very important. But do we need economics? The grand theories? The great textbooks? Or do we need sort of engineering manuals to sort of, to solve identifiable problems of costs and benefits in ordinary, everyday things we might want to do. That’s a question I leave you with. I don’t really know the answer. I tend to have a limited
view of the matter, rather than a sort of grand, eloquent view of economic theory. I think it has its purposes. But it is something that I
think we need to reflect about as we decide that we
want to be economists. What are we doing? The old argument, there was another thing, old kind of joke, really, that you measure how good an economist is by the size of his portfolio. And a lot of people still
believe that, by the way. Economists who can make
money are worth listening to. And economists who can’t are clearly talking hot air. So the idea that economics
is about money and riches and increasing it, and then
tells you how to do it, is quite deeply ingrained. But you then are always left driven back to the question of how much? How much is enough?

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