Soviet “War-Winning” Tanks in 1941? The Role of Tanks on the Eastern Front WW2

Soviet “War-Winning” Tanks in 1941? The Role of Tanks on the Eastern Front WW2


People often say that, right from the beginning,
the Soviets have superior tanks to the Germans in WW2. They say – again, right from the beginning
of the war – the Soviets have T-34s and KVs – and these of-course are war winning tanks.
You often hear how the German shells bounced off the armour of these tanks, and it is often
used as a way of showing how great the Germans must have been, in order to deal with these
impossibly powerful machines. But I think this graph alone, speaks volumes.
This is the number of tanks the Soviets have on the 22nd of June 1941. This is all of them
– not just the ones deployed against the Germans – all of them.
22,600 tanks. The blue bar – and I know it’s hard to see,
but there is a blue bar – that is the number of Soviet heavy tanks. 500 heavy tanks. This
includes the five-turret T-35s, as well as other heavies, so it’s not just 500 KVs.
The red bar is the number of medium tanks, including T-34s. That’s 900 medium tanks,
not just T-34s. Again, throughout the whole of the Soviet Union, less than 900 T-34s.
But these numbers pale in comparison to the number of light tanks the Soviets have. 21,200
light tanks. Some of these are good light tanks. But most
are not. Most wouldn’t be able to go toe-to-toe with a Panzer II. And these light tanks are
the tanks that the Germans are facing in 1941. Now, it is very tempting to say that the Germans
didn’t have lots of tanks, so the Germans are going to be overwhelmed with numbers.
This new graph shows this to be the case – the Germans have approximately 6,052 panzers,
and they deploy 3,903 tanks on the Eastern Front on June 22nd 1941. This again suggests
that the Germans must have been really great, in order to take on this many tanks with their
own tanks. Well, there’s a slight problem with this
idea – and that is this. The Germans weren’t using tanks to
hunt enemy tanks. Even Rommel, in North Africa, doesn’t do this. As I showed in my Battleaxe
documentary, Rommel’s tactic was to draw the British towards his men, by retreating
his own tanks, and then hit them with 37mm and 50mm Pak guns. These would finish off
the lighter tanks while the 88’s took out the heavier tanks at distance. “This ploy would become the standard Axis
tactic for the remainder of the war in North Africa.” Butler, Daniel Allen. Field Marshal: the Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Casemate Publishers, 2015. And the best part is, in the first weeks of
Barbarossa, it’s not the German Panzers doing the bulk of the work. It is the German
infantry formations. Take a look at this graph. These are the German
divisions on the Eastern Front on the 22nd of June 1941. 19 Panzer divisions. 13 Motorised.
The rest – infantry. Well, one of them is actually a cavalry division, but I didn’t
want to create a whole new column for that, so I’ve included that with the infantry.
But you get the idea. The vast majority of the German divisions are not panzer divisions.
But while their tanks are outnumbered, their infantry are not. The Germans outnumber the
Soviets on the first day of the war. The red bar shows the number of Red Army troops on
the Eastern Front, vs the Blue bar for the Axis. The Germans alone outnumber the Soviets,
but obviously I had to include all Axis here otherwise – well, the Soviets can’t ignore the other axis so they’re spread out. The other two bars are the number of men in both their armed forces, and I’ve included that
to show you that not all of the troops are on the Eastern Front at this time.
The bulk of the German divisions are infantry divisions, and it is these guys that do a
lot of the work in the early weeks of Barbarossa. Unlike in later battles, such as Kursk, the
infantry are the ones doing the bulk of the work. And by that what I mean is, once the panzers
have broken through the lines, and encircled or exploited through the gaps, it is the infantry
doing the clearing up. This also means, taking out Soviet tanks.
The best way I can illustrate this is to take a look at the biggest tank engagement of the
entire war – and no, it’s not Kursk – it’s in fact the Battle of Dubno in 1941.
728 German tanks of Army Group South (specifically Panzergruppe 1) face off against – by my recent
calculation – 4,798 Soviet tanks. Here, you can see the German tank numbers
(the blue bar) vs the red heavy tanks, the yellow medium tanks, and the green light tanks
of the Soviets engaged at Dubno. On paper, at least, this looks like an unfair fight.
The 291 Soviet heavy tanks, plus the 411 Soviet medium tanks – which equals 702 tanks alone
– is almost equal to the German tank numbers, even without the light tanks.
But this picture does not tell the whole story. And this, by the way, is the problem when
comparing statistics of various tank numbers, or tank designs – they can only get you so
far. You have to then go and dig a bit deeper to get the real picture. The first problem is that 2,000 of these Soviet
tanks do not even make it to the battlefield. And why is that?
The answer is simply – they do not have the support network to sustain themselves in the
field. They’re breaking down and the Soviets are forced to just blow them up because they don’t
have sufficient maintenance formations. They run out of fuel, because they haven’t got any fuel stockpiled. They haven’t stockpiled
enough quantities of it because – well why would they? They weren’t expecting a fight – nor
do they have good logistical foundations in place to keep these tanks supplied. They run
out of ammunition, they run out of fuel, they break down. It is a complete disaster. “The combat vehicles in the 22nd Mechanized
Corps undoubtedly remained on the roads as a result of a lack of fuel, as well as technical
problems. During the retreat these tanks became trophies for the Germans.”
Iseav, Dubno P92 And why is this the case? Is it because the
Soviets are incompetent? Well, no. In 1935, the entire Soviet military had 930,000
men. In February 1939, they have 1,565,020 men.
On the 22nd of June 1941, the Soviets have 5,700,000 men.
Of these, 2,743,000 are deployed on the Eastern Front. “In only 36 months, the Red Army grew by
almost four million men and 163 divisions, and a series of armoured, mechanized, and
specialist units had been formed from scratch.” Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind P114 As I showed in my Purges video, this is the
main reason that the Soviet officer corps is lacking experience. At Dubno, most of the
men and officers in the tank formations had only been in the military for a year. In fact,
the mechanized divisions themselves had only been created in late 1940. The Purges were
a drop in the ocean compared to the expansion of the Red Army. But this isn’t about officers,
this is about maintenance and logistical services. So how does this explain why the Soviet tanks
are breaking down? Or why the Soviet tanks were taken out in large numbers in the first few days of the war? The main point is this – the Germans are attacking the Soviet Union in the middle of a mobilization
effort. A mobilization effort that is far from finished. So far from finished, that
a good portion of the Soviet tank divisions haven’t got enough trucks for their riflemen. “Neither the 37th Tank Division, 15th Mechanized
Corps, nor the 39th Tank Division, 16th Mechanized Corps, nor the 41st Tank Division, 22nd Mechanized
Corps had received their required vehicles by the outbreak of war and were only nominally
considered mobile formations. The motorized infantry in these regiments advanced on foot,
just like standard infantry.” Iseav P33 (edited to removed brackets from
quote) The motorized divisions were even worse off.
They didn’t receive any vehicles at all. In fact, regular rifle divisions were more
mobile than the motorized divisions, because they at least were equipped with horses to
pull their artillery. The reason for this was because the Soviet
High Command had realized that tanks were important and wanted to create new tank divisions, tank
corps, and tank armies. So they created new formations and new doctrines from September
1940 onwards. And because of the strategic situation changing, and the Soviets believing
that if Hitler was ever to attack in the future, he would concentrate against the Ukraine and
the Caucasus (which is where he actually did want to attack, but Halder decided otherwise), they
were busy concentrating their forces in the south. “Thus, just as the German attack caught
the Soviets in transition to new organizations, leaders, equipment, and doctrine, it also
found them shifting troop concentrations.” Glantz, When Titans Clashed P45 At Dubno, the Soviet tank forces are defeated,
not by the German tanks, but mostly by the German infantry formations – either as part
of the panzer divisions, or the regular infantry divisions.
What happens is this – the Soviet tanks go ahead onto the battlefield alone, and then get
chewed up. Why? Because the Soviet motorized and mechanized
formations, aren’t equipped with enough trucks or tractors. Their infantry and artillery can’t keep up with the tanks. And even if they could, there’s not enough of them. 22nd Mechanized Corps
has 786 tanks, and only 100 artillery pieces for all three of its divisions. That simply
isn’t enough. German artillery prevents what little infantry the Soviet tanks might
have, from keeping up with the tanks. The tanks are then isolated, and then defeated by the
German infantry, or by artillery and anti-tank guns. German tanks, on the other hand, face
very little Soviet artillery. So they can rely on their own infantry and artillery for
support. Now of course, there are tank-on-tank engagements,
but the large tank number superiority that the Soviets seem to have on paper, on the
22nd of June 1941, is simply not there. Most of these tanks are light tanks, and the standard
German infantry anti-tank guns can take them out. It is these that do the bulk of the work,
as the combat journal of the 48th Corps for the 23rd of June 1941 states – “What we did not anticipate in this battle
was the fanatical fighting spirit of the Russian tank crews. Despite our obvious advantage
in terms of strength of numbers and in anti-tank weapons the enemy light tanks continued to
attack, despite their losses. Even when they were in a hopeless situation, with their engines
smashed and their caterpillar tracks ripped they would fire until they had no ammunition
left or would start fighting afresh once our tanks had passed them.”
From the combat journal of the XXXXVIII Corps for the Radzekhov engagement 23rd of June
1941 The light tanks were clearly no match for
the German anti-tank guns. Note though that the journal mentions an obvious advantage
in strength of numbers for the Germans, and also in anti-tank weaponry. It does not mention
its own tank forces attacking Soviet tanks. In fact, it says they passed them. And also
note there is no mention of Soviet infantry or artillery.
This, by the way, is the story of Barbarossa. The Germans have more infantry on the field
of battle until December rolls around. They take out large numbers of Soviet infantry
– and the Soviets are sending everything they have to the front – but they take these out
because they outnumber the Soviets. Only in December 1941 does this situation change.
Now, what about the T-34s? What about these war winning tanks? How did the Germans take
these out? “Some very fast, heavy enemy tanks appeared
with 76.2mm armament [T-34s] that are capable of firing very accurately over a long range.
Our tanks clearly concede to them. The 37mm anti-tank armament is hopeless against them,
they can only be hit at close range, with an 88mm anti-aircraft gun at higher than average
range.” From the combat journal of the XXXXVIII Corps for the Radzekhov engagement 23rd of June 1941
[From Page 84, Dubno, Isaev.] 37mm anti-tank guns are useless against the
T-34s. But the 50mm guns and the 88mm guns can take them out. The point is that this
wasn’t a tank vs tank war. In fact, this the the point of Blitzkrieg
– or Bewegungskrieg “war of movement” – find the gaps in the enemy lines and exploit
and encircle. The German tanks tend to avoid tank battles and try to outflank and get past
them. Now, the Soviets do have some success at this
early stage – the Germans aren’t just winning everywhere. When the German tank formations
come across Soviet anti-tank formations, they take heavy casualties. For example, on the
24th of June 1941, 13th Panzer Division loses a significant portion of their tanks in just one
day. This was a full 38% of the total tanks they had at the start of the day, lost on
the third day of the war. And actually, the majority of these tanks, that were lost, were
Panzer IIIs. They actually lose 64% of their Panzer IIIs, on the third day of the war.
Not through tank vs tank engagements, but through tank vs anti-tank engagements. “What were for 1941 relatively heavy losses
can be explained first and foremost by the clash with the 1st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade.”
Isaev, Dubno P93 It is not because they engaged Soviet tanks.
The Germans lose relatively few tanks to tank-on-tank engagements. Now, even though their guns aren’t
always capable of taking on the heavier Soviet tanks, the Germans still had ways of taking
out the Soviet tanks without resorting to using their own tanks. And this is mainly
due to the lack of Soviet artillery and infantry support. “Our 3.7cm anti-tank gun waits patiently
while the tanks come within a suitable firing range… Then however we couldn’t believe
our eyes: our anti-tank shells were just bouncing off the tanks. The enemy tanks kept advancing
towards us without stopping and were firing at us with all their weapons. Then something
unexpected happened: after recovering from the fright of seeing these steel giants, our
infantry began to attack, throwing hand grenades at the tanks.”
1st Gebirgsjäger Division’s history, from Isaev P105 Note that this is from the 1st Mountain Division.
They do not have tanks. They only have anti-tank guns and infantry. And without artillery and
infantry, the Soviet tanks are disabled by the German infantry. And this isn’t the
only example – “Their attacks were not coordinated. Therefore
with the help of artillery and anti-tank crews a large number of tanks were destroyed.”
97th Light Infantry Division’s history, from Isaev P106 This is not 1917. The infantry are capable
of taking on tanks. And so, this is not a tank vs tank war. Tanks are important – but
their use is not in engaging other enemy tanks. It is in exploiting through gaps.
Encircling. And crippling enemy formations. German tanks are able to do this. Soviet tanks
aren’t capable of doing this due to their lack of infantry, artillery, logistics, and
maintenance units. For Dubno, the largest tank engagement of the war, and the largest
in 1941, Isaev comes to this conclusion – “In itself the tank is a steel box with
a very poor, restricted, view of the outside world. If tanks broke through to enemy positions
on their own they would be fired upon by heavy artillery and Molotov cocktails would be thrown
at them. Therefore protecting tanks with thick armour provides little security if they are
to move successfully since their movements need to be protected by their own infantry.
The infantry that are protecting the tanks are able to do so not just by firing the tank’s
machine guns but by winning the duel with artillery. Otherwise the howitzers in masked
positions, against which tanks are vulnerable, would mow down the infantry, or force them
to lie low, leaving the tanks exposed.” Iseav P194
[Note: poor translation. Corrected some sentence structure mistakes.] This is the reason in 1941 that the Soviet tank
forces are defeated – it’s because they don’t have infantry and artillery support.
Why do they not have infantry and artillery support? They are in the middle of a mobilization
program, and a reorganization effort, which is in reaction to the German successes of
the previous year. They are reforming their tank forces, and reforming their motorized
and mechanized units, which didn’t exist in this capacity just a few years before.
They are caught completely by surprise by the German attack.
As a result, they don’t have enough trucks or the artillery to support these formations.
Their infantry can’t keep up and therefore can’t protect the tanks. The little artillery that
they do have can’t move to the battlefield, and those that do actually make it, are too
little to make a difference. And this is why the German infantry are able to take out as
many tanks as they do. Tank vs tank engagements do happen. They happen
at Dubno. They happen elsewhere. But that is not what tanks are meant to be doing in
a Blitzkrieg, or Bewegungskrieg, a “war of movement”. Their task is to exploit gaps
in the lines, encircle or cut the enemy’s lines of communications, then let the other
formations take out the stragglers. This is why the Germans do so well in 1941.
They use their tanks to get through the enemy lines and fight this war of movement. This
is also why they’re not able to repeat the successes of 1941 in both 1942, or in 1943. It’s
not because they don’t have enough tanks. German tank stocks increase year on year.
It’s because they don’t outnumber the Soviets any more. They no longer have the
fuel to fight this exploitation war – their tanks have fuel to fight locally, but not
to ride off into the sunset (or in this case, sunrise). They no longer have sufficient infantry
support, because their infantry (despite growing in numbers year on year) are stretched thin
across a massively wide front. Their logistics aren’t able to keep up with supply demands.
And the Soviets have learnt their lesson. Take a look at this chart.
Now I have deliberately not put a key on this chart because I think’s better without.
The first bar – the blue one – is the number of tanks the Soviets have on the 22nd of June
1941. The second bar – the red one – is the number of tanks the Soviets have on the 1st
of January 1943. You can see, it decreases slightly.
This at a time when the German tanks are in fact increasing. The Germans have more tanks
in 1943 than they do in 1941. The yellow bar – the third bar – is the number
of anti-tank guns the Red Army has on the 22nd of June 1941. The green bar – the fourth
bar – is the number of anti-tank guns the Red Army has on the 1st of January 1943. Again,
slight decrease. This at the time when the Germans have more
tanks than ever before. Purple bar – the fifth bar – is the number
of artillery pieces the Soviets have on the 22nd of June 1941. The [light] blue bar – the
sixth bar – is the number of artillery pieces the Soviets have at the beginning of 1943.
Ok, a slight increase. These are also anti-tank weapons. 76.2mm field
guns are great at taking out – well, any and all German tank at this stage – except maybe the Tigers.
So this is an important weapon. But what is that last one?
What the? What is it!? Do you want to guess? Take a guess.
Pink and Green. What are these final two bars? Pink is 22nd of June 1941.
And Green is January 1943. A massive increase.
Bearing in mind, they’ve already lost hundreds of thousands of these … by this point.
And no, it’s not rifles. The Soviets actually have more rifles in 1941 than they do in
1943. Is it planes? Nope. Is it trucks? Nope. Is it anti-tank… No, and anti-aircraft guns? Is it anti-aircraft guns? No. This – and you’re going to hate me – this is
the weapon that the Soviets are relying on to win the war.
This is the war-winning weapon of WW2. What on Earth is it? It is… the Mortar. But wait a sec – mortars can’t take out
tanks? No, but they can take out infantry. And what
are tanks without infantry? As we’ve just found out – they’re useless.
The thing you have to remember about the Eastern Front of WW2 is that the Soviets aren’t actually
facing that many German tanks. The Germans only have 7,505 tanks in July
of 1943. They actually peak in the December of 1942
at 7,798 total tanks. But that’s every tank in stock everywhere,
not just the Eastern Front. As I showed last week, the Germans do not
have the fuel to put all these tanks in the field.
The vast majority of the German formations in the field are not Panzer divisions. They
are infantry divisions. The Soviets are not facing tanks, they’re
facing German infantry. German infantry numbers peak in July of 1943.
In July of 1943, the Germans have three million, four-hundred and eighty-three thousand men
on the Eastern Front. This is the most they’ll ever have. They
also have other Axis troops, meaning that they actually have over 4 million men on the
Eastern Front. And this is in July of 1943.
This idea that the Germans are running out of infantry – not until after July of 1943.
This idea that this was a tank vs tank war – no.
The Soviets are not taking on tanks. They’re taking on infantry. And what takes out infantry?
Rifles, artillery, mortars, grenades, molotov cocktails.
Yes, tanks and anti-tank guns are super important. They can’t get to Berlin without tanks and
trucks. But as we can see, they’re not engaging that many panzers. They’re engaging infantry.
And that is the point – they’re using their tanks to help their infantry and artillery
defeat the Germans, and the German infantry. This is why Prokhorovka is a disaster for the Soviets. Stalin is angry
at Rotmistrov for losing 400 out of 500 tanks, charging 200 German panzers. “What have you done to your magnificent
tank army?” Stalin asked Rotmistrov. What was the point of Prokhorovka? It’s a stupid
idea. This was a head-on clash that proved to be mostly pointless. Tanks fighting tanks,
especially head on, is just a complete waste. Infantry formations could have done the job just as
well. Now, while it isn’t as romantic. And it isn’t
as glorious. And while it perhaps isn’t perhaps as cool. The war was actually an infantry war. Tanks
are very important. But they cannot win the war alone.
Take out the infantry, you take out the tanks. Tanks cannot win the World War II alone.
Thank you very much to the Patreons for your continuing support. You make these videos
possible, because you’re awesome. If you haven’t seen my Purges video, go check it
out. Stalin’s Purge of the Red Army doesn’t have the impact you may think it does. Link
on the screen, and in the description below. Thank you all for watching, bye for now.

100 Comments on "Soviet “War-Winning” Tanks in 1941? The Role of Tanks on the Eastern Front WW2"


  1. Disagree? Would love to see your counterargument.

    No timestamps because it’s not that type of video. It requires you to watch it from start to finish. Would also recommend you don’t read this comment fully until AFTER watching the video… but I know some of you won’t wait for that, so don’t say you weren’t warned 🙂

    Notes –

    For those that will no doubt come back and say that “nobody ever says the T-34 and the KV’s were war winning tanks”. No, people do. I’ve had quite a few comments claiming this, and there are sites out there that do say this. For example,
    https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-t-34-was-a-war-winning-tank-662ba112774f
    https://www.warhistoryonline.com/guest-bloggers/soviet-t-34-tank.html

    Some very interesting quotes from Iseav on the Dubno battle you guys may find interesting –

    “Anyone who has not limited themselves to merely studying the initial period of the history of the war would be struck by the abundance of infantry divisions on the site of the tank battles in the triangle formed of Brody-Lutsk-Dubno. This was never subsequently repeated. In the advance outside Kursk in the summer of 1943 German tank divisions were forced to plot the route in front of them independently and from the first few days, or even hours of the battle, they were ‘gnawing through’ the Soviet defence. In this same location outside Kursk there was no amiable breaking in the defence as had happened in the case of the ‘Molotov Line’ in Ukraine in the first half of the day on 22 June 1941. Between 1944-1945 the operational support for tank formations by infantry was very poor and unregulated. Moreover, as the number of infantry formations decreased that had fought in the battle, between 1943-1945 the quality of the infantry deteriorated considerably.”

    -From Isaev, P192-193

    “Naturally such a multifaceted phenomenon as a week-long battle of a large number of tanks is not just limited to a clash of tanks and infantry. The enemy divisions that were armed with tanks unavoidably clashed on the battlefield. Complex factors determined the winner in these battles, but first and foremost it was the organisational structure of the tank forces on both sides. Here the Wehrmacht’s infantry and artillery, though this time they were motorized, were a match for the tanks of the Red Army. This enabled the pulverisation of enormous numbers of light tanks and the attacks by T-34s and KVs to be countered.”

    -From Iseav P193-194

    This next quote is from the Staff of Strategy and Tactics Magazine. Page 122 (see sources below)

    “1942-45 Soviet Motorized Anti-Tank Regiment –
    “This is the unit that destroyed the German "panzerblitz" in the East. Based on their experience, the Soviets calculated that 12 rounds of 45mm or six of 76mm gun fire were needed to destroy one medium tank. Based on the calculation, each 76mm gun was expected to put 2 or 3 medium tanks out of action before being destroyed. Heavier tanks (Panther and Tiger) cut the 76mm gun's effectiveness by about half. But the Soviets were producing more 76mm guns than the Germans were producing tanks. In the 1944 the Soviets produced 23,800 76mm anti-tank guns (some 20 percent more than 1943) as well as 16,500 45mm guns (then being replaced by the 57mm gun). The Soviets employed their 76mm guns in batteries of four guns, all concentrating their fire on one target at a time.”

    From the Rommel Papers talking about tanks in North Africa –

    “[The Mark II Matilda tanks] were also only supplied with solid, armour-piercing shell. It would be interesting to know why the Mark II was called an infantry tank, which it had no H.E. ammunition with which to engage the opposing infantry. It was also, as I have already said, far too slow. In fact, its only real use was in a straight punch to smash a hole in a concentration of material.”

    What’s interesting is the Rommel’s main concerns about the British tanks were their speed and guns. He notes that the Matilda had heavy armour, but was too slow and that it’s gun was not capable for firing HE, meaning it wasn’t a very effective infantry-fighting machine, and was easy to take out with the 88mms. Heavy tanks therefore can be vulnerable.

    He also praises the Crusader tank for being very fast, but says its gun (2-pdr, the same gun as the Matilda) had too short a range. He says if only it had a heavier gun “it could have made things extremely unpleasant for us.” He even says this gun therefore did not make up for the “heavy armour it carried”. For Rommel at least, armour protection alone is not as important as speed, maneuverability, and firepower.

    “The armoured units which they threw against our striking force in the area north of Sidi Omar failed to prevent the advance of the 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division, and thanks to the excellent co-ordination between our anti-tank, armoured and A.A. forces, were themselves destroyed.” – again from the Rommel Papers.

    Last week, GM4ThePeople said “For this reason, mass-produced light vehicles, with a de-emphasis on protection, & an emphasis on mobility & firepower were indicated. Doctrine should have more closely adhered to the strategic reality. Motorised infantry, not armoured halftracks. The Pz II chassis was the solution, not the problem.”

    The Panzer II part aside, as shown in this video, the role of the tank does not require it to have overly thick armour. Therefore it could be argued that medium tank designs are the most suitable sort of tank. I do think that Panzer IIs were a little too weak in this, since they couldn’t fit a decent enough gun in their turret. Panzer IIIs also have limited turrets – which is why the StuG design was very good. But the Panzer IV is a great tank which, perhaps with the adoption of sloped armour, could have been focused on, even in the late war. It could, and often has, be argued that the production of Panthers and other heavy tanks (Tigers were good for morale purposes, but beyond that, there were too few to make a difference) was a waste. If you consider tanks to be used as exploitation vehicles, then heavier tank designs are a waste.

    Then again, the Germans didn’t have the fuel to fight the war of movement anyway so perhaps it’s a mute point. Perhaps heavier tanks were the best option for the Germans, given the circumstances. Would love to know your thoughts on these points.

    I also want to point out that the Soviet mortar numbers are the only weapon number that increases by that much. Most other weapons either increase somewhat or decrease somewhat, but not multiply by that amount.

    The conclusion in this video will play an important part in explaining both the Crusader and Stalingrad battles – both of which I’m still working on creating “Battlestorm” documentaries for. Next week’s video will be Stalingrad-related…

    Selected Sources

    Butler, Daniel Allen. Field Marshal: the Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Casemate Publishers, 2015.
    Clark, L. “Kursk: The Greatest Tank battle Eastern Front 1943.” Kindle, Headline Publishing, 2013.
    Mawdsley, E. “Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945.” Second Edition, Kindle, University of Oxford.
    Glantz, D. When Titan’s Clashed. University Press of Kansas, 2015.
    Kavalerchik, B. The Price of Victory: The Red Army’s Casualties in the Great Patriotic War. Pen & Sword Military, 2017.
    Liedtke, G. Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion & Company LTD, 2016.
    Isaev, A. Dubno 1941. The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War. Helion & Company, 2017.
    Healy, M. Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943. Kindle edition, 2016.
    Hart, L. The Rommel Papers. 1953.

    War in the East, Staff of Strategy and Tactics Magazine (this section on order of battle by James F. Dunnigan), Simulation Publication s Inc., NY, 1977. Page 122

    Link to Purges video – https://youtu.be/JnWNnI6YlQQ

    Please consider supporting me on Patreon – https://www.patreon.com/TIKhistory

    Thank you all for watching!

    Reply

  2. Word Of Tank washed people's brains out. They imagine tanks as F1 bolids driving with high speed, shooting all the time, crews closed for good inside.

    Reply

  3. It is very difficult to coordinate infantry with tanks. Even more so when your tanks have no radios like the early Soviet tanks. That is the primary reason for their poor coordination.

    Reply

  4. The Soviets won WW2 with their 82mm and 120mm mortars. A Soviet rifle company had two or three 50mm mortars. The Soviet rifle battalion had the 82mm mortars. The Soviet rifle regiment regiment had the 120mm mortars. The Soviets had many versions of the 50mm mortar. The 107mm mortar was designed for mountain troops. The large 160mm mortar was produced in a breech loader and fired shell requiring two men to lift because it 90 lbs shell. But the main mortars used in the largest numbers to the greatest impact in combat were the 82mm battalion mortar and the 120mm regimental mortars. The rifle company usually had two or three 50mm mortars. The Soviet rifle battalion had nine 82mm mortars in a company. The Soviet rifle regiment had seven 120mm mortars. These mortars were often centrally controlled with an officer in charge them with telephone or radio controls to forward observers. The officer in charge of the battalion 82mm mortars had to set up his forward observers, usually assigned to the rifle companies or in the vicinity. The mortars were registered on known landmarks by the forward observers who would accurately and quickly lay down heavy mortar barrages wherever needed in the rifle battalions areas of responsibility whether on offense or defense.

    Mortars became one of the the most important weapons in the Soviet rifle division's arsenal. The 120mm regimental mortar fired a heavy nearly 15.9 kilogram bomb. The 120mm mortar was one of the effective weapons of any type in the war. If you understand mortars and how important they were to the Soviet rifle division, you gain a better understanding of how WW2 on the Eastern front was fought. Tanks are important but mortars and artillery are what win infantry fights. The tanks just help the artillery and mortars to move forward to fight the enemy again. The side with the most effective mortar and artillery barrages is often the side that wins the battle. Nothing is more important
    to infantry battalions than effective mortar barrages put on the enemies head. The heavy machine guns and medium machine guns will force enemy troops to take cover in dead spaces. The mortars then drop quick accurate heavy barrage on those dead spaces roght on top of their heads. This type of mortar and machine gun teamwork is where the lethality of teamwork comes to impact the battle. This lower level combined arms teamwork between mortars, automatic weapons, and small field guns are more important than arguing about which side had the best tank.

    http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ontheway/index.html

    http://wio.ru/galgrnd/mortar.htm

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  5. A small correction: T34 become a good tank after 1943, when USA has built 2 factories for transmission and it has received new 85mm gun.Also soviet tank crews always preferred Shermans over T34, since Sherman crews had better surviving rate.

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  6. Ya dumb commies and limeys don’t realise that if Easy company hasn’t encircled the 40005th German Andy in the Battle of Moscow Ireland in 1945 then the world would be speaking German right about now. We Americans done saved every single one of you 🇺🇸

    Please don’t kill me it is a joke from a brit.

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  7. this dude starts the video with the biggest strawman that I've ever heard I've never hurt anybody claim the things that he claims people say. and who are these people who say these things

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  8. It may be an older source, but I am impressed with how how much of this Clark got right in "Barbarossa." The Soviet "advantage" in tanks is useless when, as you say, they are light tanks, thrown in piecemeal, if they even made it to the front, by inexperienced commanders, and then smashed against German AT guns. Great video.

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  9. Fails to mention the Germans had air superiority, radios, and much better leadership. The reason the Russians went for infantry was because infantry were cheap to produce.

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  10. Thank you! Very good job. I myself am fond of the history of the Second world war, and I can confirm that you told everything correctly. Greetings from Russia!)

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  11. Fabulous Commentary and Analysis TIK!! Your channel is jam packed with facts and figures and statistics and you make your points very convincingly. GREAT JOB BROTHER!!

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  12. You start off, by making a big deal about the Soviets having only 500 Heavy tanks on 6/22/41. Well the Germans had Zero Heavy tanks.

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  13. Question: During your summation at the end of this video, there is a picture in the background showing German infantry passing a tank laying on its side/turret. Can you share the origin of this picture and is there a story that accompanies it?

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  14. The German tanks that were used during Operation Barbarossa were PzKpfw IIs, IIIs, IVs, 35(t)s, and 38(t)s, as well as some captured tanks. With exception of the IV the rest are light tanks. There were about 480 Panzer IV medium tanks in Operation Barbarossa, no German heavy tanks were used. So it was light tanks against light tanks.

    A burning T-34 and other vehicles destroyed in the encirclement battles between Bialystok and Minsk. Soviet tank units were badly handled during 'Barbarossa', and the standard of crew training was poor. The first T-34s were also prone to mechanical breakdowns.

    The Soviet Union had twice or perhaps three times the number of both tanks and aircraft as the Germans had, but their aircraft were mostly obsolete. The Soviet tanks were about equal to those of the Germans, however. A greater hindrance to Hitler’s chances of victory was that the German intelligence service underestimated the troop reserves that Stalin could bring up from the depths of the U.S.S.R. The Germans correctly estimated that there were about 150 divisions in the western parts of the U.S.S.R. and reckoned that 50 more might be produced. But the Soviets actually brought up more than 200 fresh divisions by the middle of August, making a total of 360. The consequence was that, though the Germans succeeded in shattering the original Soviet armies by superior technique, they then found their path blocked by fresh ones. The effects of the miscalculations were increased because much of August was wasted while Hitler and his advisers were having long arguments as to what course they should follow after their initial victories.

    The Battle of Raseiniai was a large tank battle fought at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. The battle was fought in Lithuania, then part of the Soviet Union's Northwestern Front.

    Some 240 German tanks from the 4th Panzer Group were tasked with destroying almost 750 Soviet tanks of the 3rd and 12th Mechanized Corps.

    Despite their numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht, the result of the battle was an utter catastrophe for the Soviets. Some 700 Soviet tanks and their crews — almost the entirety of the Soviet Union's deployed mechanized units on the Northwestern Front — were destroyed, damaged, or captured.

    The Battle of Brody is the largest tank battle in history, according to some historians.

    Also fought during the beginning stages of Operation Barbarossa, the battle saw some 1,000 German panzers of the 1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps smash into 3,000 Soviet tanks from the six mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th and 6th Armies.

    Again outnumbered, the Wehrmacht proved that superior training, tactics, communication technology, and air support make all the difference.

    The exact number of casualties is not known, but estimates put Soviet tank losses at somewhere between 800 to over 1,000. The Wehrmacht also suffered heavy casualties, with anywhere between 200 to 350 tanks destroyed.

    The Battle of Prokhorovka took place during the larger Battle of Kursk. It was long thought to be the largest tank battle in history, but according to the book Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943 by Valeriy Zamulin, a Russian military historian, that is not the case.

    But that is not to say it was small or insignificant. The battle saw over 600 Soviet tanks from the 5th Guards Tank Army smash head on into around 300 German tanks from the II SS-Panzer Corps.

    The fighting was some of the most intense in the history of armored warfare. The Soviets lost around 400 tanks, more than half of their force. German tank losses were smaller by comparison, up to 80 tanks and assault guns destroyed.

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  15. Panzer 2 had 20 mm gun completely useless against any soviet tank. Recommend books by Mark Solonin Guy have no idea what he is talking about.

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  16. Superb video. Tbh, none of it was brand new to me…until the datapoint on the huge increase in USSR mortars by 1943 compared to relatively minor changes in other weapon types. THAT was mind-blowing.

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  17. Why did you forget about German dominance in the sky?

    Tanks without aviation support are simply coffins.

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  18. An excellent review on the over-rated early T-34… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98JbJuXE3JE&t=52s

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  19. Great video. I have to congratulate you on your objectivity. You have not fallen for Cold war Western propaganda and you have preserved integrity of history. Same goes for Soviet propaganda. Thank you for these excellent videos.

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  20. before Second World War start Russian deploy about 30/40% part of their own aviation and tanks against Japanese invasion!.. in "Manchuria".
    PS
    In Finland Soviets started war in 1939… and loose a LOT'S OF armoured vehicles and artillery!.. and aircraft's.

    Russia's never had good commandments never had good weapons never had supply never had anything they win because there was a lot of them… like a plague!!!

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  21. I would ask why the soviets had almost 8000 tanks close to the German border, in the opening weeks of Barbarossa, if as you say they were not expecting to fight.I believe that amount of soviet armour along with the vast amount of soldiers from the red army, killed or POWs in the opening batttles in July-Aug, suggest an offensive was coming from the soviets, who expected the Germans to be still fighting in France.Absoloutely nobody including Stalin could predict the speed of German victory in the West.

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  22. The 37mm gun could easily take out T-34s with HE rounds.
    So it wasn't limited to just taking out light tanks.

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  23. That graph explains the German tank kill counts. It's not surprising if a Panzer 4 can blow up 2 or 3 soviet tanks with ease if they're all light tanks, I bet the light tanks couldn't even penetrate medium tank armour

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  24. Thankyou for your replies on this subject, i will view the link.Having read Ice Breaker by Suvurov, he goes into great detail about the amount of Red Army paratroops being trained, thousands more than any nation involved in WW2, this….if correct, proves Stalin had some offensive in mind, maybe the Romanian oilfields, but most likely Germany itself.Was Stalin, when asked if he was happy on how the war ended quote…."No, some Czar (im not sure which one) in earlier conflict had reached Paris" tells a story into his thinking.

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  25. The only way to seize ground is with a rifleman and his bayonette. I was tought this in the Army in 1994. It was true in the 1940's and it's still true today.

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  26. Germany lost the war because they didn't have enough Men for the size of Russia. My bet they needed a force of 5 million maybe 7 million man army in 1941. I never would of done it what Hitler had in 1941. If he would of waited until 1947 had Jets . Why was Hitler in such a hurry? Lets take over it all in 6 years just to much for what he had is Why/

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  27. When you give numbers to a soft-scientist, but despite the epic data science issues, but the point remains

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  28. The T 34-2 men turret and only the platoon tank had radio. The commander was gunner and commander once he was taken out you had only a machine gun to fight with. This was the best one they had, with armour like that you don't employ combined tactics. The T34/85 was a different tank altogether and it's effectiveness was superior to the Pz IV and maybe just slightly inferior to the Panther but made it up by its reliability and sheer numbers, they produced over 20000 of the T34/85 against total production of the Panther of 4500 at the Tiger I and II production you won't even make 7000.

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  29. Omg, again you fill the world with your false propaganda. Surely you have family or friends who know where you live and could hold you under……. For 10 minutes or so. Your a danger to world peace and freedom and I deem you excess to requirements. Can you fight Pommy fart breath or are you just a pommy commie mono brow fool. Hands up girly…..na, you'll run and cry I bet.

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  30. Germany should have started the War in September 1942. Having 3
    extra years to fully equip all of its Divisions. Were each of the Panzer Divisions would have (18500 men, 270 Panzer IIIs, 90 Panzer IVs, 45 Panzee IIs, 25 Panzer Is. Plus 90 Armored Cars, 270 Halph-Trucks, 45 Mazden IIIs. Plus 36 105 mm Guns, 18 155 mm H/ Guns, 72 (18 50 mm) ATGuns, 6 210 mm Very Heavy Guns,18 The Deadly – 88s ATGuns, 185 81 mm Morters, 18 Bofores AAGs, 36 Small AAGs. Plus 1250 Trucks, 450 Paseger Cars, 150 jeep and 50 motorcy-cles). Also stocking on Coal, Iron, Oil, Food, Water, Spear Parts. Plus Ammunition, Gun Shells, Morter Shells, Bombs, Other. From Russia, Rumania and Europe. Russia was Supplying Germany with alot of Weat, Coal, Iron, Oil. Having by Septembet 1942, 263 Divisions (185 Infantry, 24 Panzer, 14 Motz. Rifle, 3 SS Panzer Grd., 8 Light, 8 Mountain, 12 Security, 3 Parashu-te, 1 Air-Born, 1 Logistics, 1 Const- uction, 6 Coastal Divisions). About 18 Infantry Armys, 6 Panzet Grou-pen, 6 Air Armys (About 18,000 War Playns). With 9.5 million men. Having 18500 Tanks, 6000 Armo red Cars and 36500 Halph-Trucks. Plus 3000 Mazden IIIs, 9500 Guns, 18500 ATGuns, 6500 81 mm Mort-ers, 125000 Trucks, also to 45000 Paseger Cars, 15000 Jeep and about 5000 Morocycles. The Navy would continue the Z-Plan and to have then:" 2 Battleships, 4 Pocket Battleshios, 8 H / Criusers, and 8 L / Crusers, 27 Destroyers, 6 Ray-ders, 18 Torpido Boats, 36 Small Attack Petrol Boats, 65 Transport Ships, 6 LST, 2 LSV, 6 Oilers, 350 Submarines and 3 Air- Craft Carr-ers (120 War Playins". But by then the German Industry, should have Statred Full Production (February 1940). Then in September 1942 the Germans would have started the War. Taking in 3 years (From September 1942 —— September 1945, most of Europe (Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Lux., Belgium, France, UK, N. Italy, Malta, Hungary Rumania, Bulgaria. Then Tunisia, Eygept and also the Sinai (Gen.Rommel). Capturing Dankerk and the 350 000 English and also French troops there. Attacking in UK only Military Targets (Air-Ports, Navy Bases and also Army Bases). Then after landing by the Sea (Sea Lion), 450,000 men (In 12 Infantry, 6 Panzer, 2 Motz. Rifle, 1 SS Panz-er, 1 Security, 2 Mountain, 1 Air-Born Division). And 3 Air – Armys (6000 War Playns) and also all of there Navy ( 55 War Ships, 3 Air – Craft Carriers (120 War Playns), and 350 Submarined. Plus all the Other Ships needed to land the First Wave of 75, 000 men. All
    the above down in 18 – 24 months. After take Palestine, Lebanon and Syria (Ge. Romemel) and Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait (Gen. Thomas) that
    is all of the Middle East ( In 4 – 6 months. Gen.Rommel would have had moved to Tripoly ( Libya) from February 1942 – To end of July (In 6 months) 1942, 240, 000 men
    ( In 6 Infantry, 4 Panzer, 2 Motz. Rifle, 1 SS Panzer Grd and 1 Light Division) and then after atracked Eygept in February 1943 (And take 3 months).Then attack the Sinai in May 1943 (And take in 1 Month). Then the Middle East in June 1943 (And take in 6 months), by End of November 1943. As then all these events take place, the Germans would start moving to Tunisia and Eygept from Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece, alot of Divisions. From February 1943 —– To the end of November 1943 ( In 10 months). Having then in Tunisia, 120, 000 men ( In 3 Infantry, 2 Panzer, 1 Motz. Rifl., Division, 1 SS Panzer Grd.). Then attack Algeria in Ma- rch 1944 and after attack also to Marocco, Spanish Marocco and Gilbrator (Giving Corcica Island
    in France, to Spane). Then attack Spanish Zahara, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. Therefore then taking all in 9 mnnths (By the end of November 1944). From Eygept, the Germans would attack Sudan in March 1944 and after attack also to Ethiopia, Erythrea, Somalia and Kenia.Taking them all in about 6 months (By the end of Augest). They had for that Operation, about 240,000 men (In about 6 Infantry, 3 Panzer, 1 Motz. Rifle, 1 SS Panz-er Grd. and 2 Light). From about November 1944 —- To the end of April 1945 ( In 6 months). The Germans would assemble in Poland and Rumania 4.8 million men (In 12 Infantry Army, 6 Panz-er Groupen and 4 Air-Armys). In 200 Divisions (125 Infantry, 24 Panzer, 12 Motz. Rifle, SS 6 Panzer Grd., 12 Security, 2 Mountain and 1 Logistica and 1 Construction to Division). To attack the USSR (Ru- ssia) im May 1945. Dont forget that in 42, 43.44.45 the Germans raised more Divisions (12 Panzer, 3 SS Panzer Grd., 3 Security and
    3 Heavy Panzer Divisions). Using to the New Weapons in 43, 44, 45 (Mostly the Tanks, like Panther Is, Tiger Is and Mazden IIIs Spacials, Rino and Elefant SP 155 mm Gs). They als had Me262 jets, Ario, V1, V2 and Long Rance Bombers. That tge also building then all in Large Numbers. Then taking Iran (Persia) Gen. Rommel in March 1944. Also too controling most of the Middle East, all of North Africa and East Africa. Most also of Europe (That is Except for Portigul and Spane, Swecheland, Sweden and Iceland. Europian Russia they were going to actually Invade in May 1945. So the Germans then were in a Good Stratigic Position. Turkey would remain Neutrol or Join the Axis. The Japanise would attack the
    US Pacific Fleet Haway, in about November 1945. Then the Hole
    S. E. Pacific and in 2 years reach up to New Zealand, Figi, Samoa, take Middway and Haway. All by the end of November 1947. The Germans would have taken most of Eurooian Russia (Reaching the Line from Leningrad, Gorgi, Vero- neze, Rostov). All inabout then 6 months ( By the end of October 1945). Then with 1 Army Group attack towards Stalingrad and 1 Army Group towards the Caucasos and take the Baku Oil Fields. Gen. Rommel would take in May 1945, Afganistan, then Pakistan, India, Bugladesh (In 6 montgs). By the end of October 1945. Also from Persia send afew Divisions to take tge Baku Oil Friends and assist the German Army Group also there to.
    Since March 1944, Gen. Rommel in Persia, received more Divusions Having by May 1945, 28 Divisions (In 12 Infantry, 6 Panzer, 3 Motz. Riif and 3 SS Light Panzer (Formed in 44. 45), 1 Security, 1 Lightt and 2 Mountain). About 450, 000 men.

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  31. Mmh so yeah this whole myth about the Soviets winning the war only because of their overwhelming sheer number of troops and not because of their strategy is a myth…

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  32. TIK, your work is of incredible quality. You have earned my subscription. Keep up your superb work!

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  33. Luring enemy tanks only makes sense. The strategy of having lighter tanks to be mobile. Heavy tanks can't move in certain terrain, pass over bridges or some muddy areas. In other words, on the battlfield they were weaker, but in campaign strategy they were better suited for russian strategy of advancing past enemy lines even if the ones behind were being crushed by the germans. So to counter such tanks, one needed something more mobile and light.

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  34. Thank yo u but, History doesn't involve the actual truth. What happened to the Trillions owe to the USA by Soviet Russia???

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  35. Yes the Germans encountered the T34 from almost day 1 & it wasn't considered a major issue. The smaller turret is a problem which will over work the commander & lessened it's effective use.

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  36. Most militaries conduct "Purges" prior to war is because what's needed from officers during peacetime is very different from what's required during a conflict. The US Navy "Purged" it's submarine commanders to promote aggressive Captains which is required. I would suggest that the British didn't do this & suffered for this initially in the war.

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  37. That’s incorrect as it took maybe hundreds of t34s to overwhelm a small German division as they always go in mass. Also, a 88 anti-tank gun can punch through all of the Russian tanks even the js3. So it’s incorrect that they were war winning. It’s a meat grinder tank as they are made of poor quality and produced on mass so many have missing parts even if brand new.

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  38. The germany army also grew for couple of years from 300 thousand People. So why is So different, why germany also do not have the same issues.

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  39. Nice to see you are reading Isaev on this topic, his books are great but unfortunately not that well-known outside Russia

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  40. I think the changes in the Soviet force structure since 1942 is quite telling. While they eventually came up with tank armies, they pale in comparison to the sheer number of artillery (both general purpose and antitank) and multiple rocket launcher regiment, brigades, divisions, and even corps the Soviets assembled. This coincided with the gradual decline in the Soviet infantry strength. In other words, the Soviets had relatively more manpower relative to firepower. However, as the war progressed, it became harder to find infantry outfits to be manned close to their authorized strength. For example, by 1944, most of Soviet rifle divisions had as few as around 2000 men, which is far lower than their authorized strength of around 10000. But by then, the Soviet force structure became much more firepower heavy. I think the cliche — infantry and artillery as the bread and butter — still holds true.

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  41. The KV-1 and -2 were far more decisive in slowing the German advance enough to ultimately make Barbarossa & it's 1942 desperate repeat Fall Blau fail. Read this
    https://m.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/battle-raseiniai-1941-single-kv-tank-stopped-entire-german-kampfgruppe.html

    Also read this about the T-34s real strength, it's reusable platform designed for long guns & soft ground, that was augmented without redesign and still innuse until the 1990s.
    https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-t-34-tank-the-weapon-crushed-hitler-won-world-war-ii-25977

    And it's silly to complain about the tight crew quarters, just assign smaller people to tank duty. Women, for instance
    https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/soviet-women-tankers.html

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  42. the more and more of your videos I watch, the more I feel that Germany really shouldn’t have invaded USSR.

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  43. This guy should make a documentary on the war in the eastern front. These factors are completely ignored in Western media.

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  44. id ordered all citizens leave the cities in GER and GAS EAST AND WEST FRONTS and say H3LL with what happens after cause the allies bombed the H3LL outta the GERMAN CITIES anyway GAS 'm till it hurts and no ROLAIDS ha

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  45. BLA BLA BLA!!! In the end Russia WINS GERMANY LOSES LIKE THE CRap cars they Built!!!! Bye buy GERMANY!!!

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  46. Without superior logistics to support the armored divisions & fast moving infantry to help protect them & the supply line, the battle is doomed & will become a savage knife fight.

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  47. This was mostly not true. Some details, even most of them, true, but in general picture is wrong. I will not argue with all 30 minutes. I will point out, that russians lost all the fuel in a first couple of hours, because all the fuel was at the first line waiting for attack on germans. And the troops were hiding in the woods waiting for order to attack germans too.

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  48. Where do you get this 6,052 tanks for the Germans from from what I Have read they hardly increased the number of tanks between 1940 and 1941! I recall reading they just had little over 3,000 in 1941 Still majority were panzer 1's and 2's with a few more Panzer 3's and 4's. Were theses added number captured French tanks? I know they used some on the Eastern front.

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  49. Wish you would have broken down the German Panzers from light Panzer1s and 2" and Czech light tanks as you do the Russian tanks

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  50. "People often say that right from the beginning the Soviets had superior tanks then the Germans in WW2" "THEY SAY AGAIN. right from the beginning of the war Soviets have T-34 and KVs"
    Mmmkay you say this and then I thought you would come with proof they didn't have it from the start… only to show that they did have them, not in large amounts BUT they do have them from the start.

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  51. It is happen in Vietnam war as well. SVN army have more military hardwares and military men than NVN army but they fight with US style. Using massive guns and artillerys but divide them to small battery. Meanwhile NVN army have less guns but they decide when and where to attack, that mean in one battle they can have more men and guns than SVN. And they break SVN line part by part. When US still in the field they have B-52 and others bombers to mobilize. But SVN don't have bombers so they easily overwhelming by NVN.

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  52. i suggest 1 thing: to look which tier was the german tanks at that time…
    yeah, most of them was…light…exactly as most of the soviet tanks was light…
    so this graph was a little pointless
    this is even funnier, germans had magical number of 0 of heavy tanks…soviet had only 500? ok then compare to to german number of 0 and tell us who was better

    most will not be able to go toe-to-toe with Panzer II …hahahahaha, dude, try to compare the statistics of BT-7 to those german tanks ok?
    the funny part is: it is the german tanks who should not be able to go toe-to-toe with BT
    so why the fuck soviet lost?
    cause of stupidity of Zhukov who attacked without any recon effort

    btw your argument about "soviet weak tanks" isn't new, the soviet propaganda said it many years ago
    they all was "weak and obsolete"
    but german Panzer II for some reason wasn't weak and obsolete…
    bullshit dude, bullshit which was destroyed many times

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  53. they had oil stocpiles but most of them fall to the germans in the first days of the war
    the stocpiles of oil, ammunition etc was close to border, even the hospitals was close to border, that's why when german attacked and takes them the soviet ended without any supplies

    that's why they did not have oil stockpiles and that's why their losses of tanks was soooo huge,simply the tank get out of fuel so they destroyed it
    if you add to this the stupidity of Zhukov as a commander…then the defeat became total

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  54. hahahaha lack of experience xD
    dude, tell me how many experience the germans officers had in 22.06.1941 ?
    how many years?
    the officer training in USSR last…3 years…they had lots of schools to train them, so yeah, most of them had NO LACK OF SKILLS
    dude, can you try to not repeat the same bullshit soviet propaganda said loooong ago?
    first the tanks, now the officers who probably was bad but after 1942 became smart and good…how the fuck officers from 1942-43 was good if officer training last 3 years?
    this mean he should start the training in…1939…when the army was a lot smaller…
    seriously dude, your arguments are hilarious, you probably think soviet weaken themself by doing purge in 1938 right?

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  55. aircraft and infantrymen with a radio won the war.
    The side who has and holds air support wins. period.
    Germans had no airforce by end of the war and thats why the russians could overpower them

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  56. well the Soviets fucked up , big time !
    They had 22 000 tanks but not enough ammo and fuel ?
    Yes, they were geniuses !
    See the Winter War for more "ground breaking" Soviet shit.

    Stalin himself was a poor commander of zero military skills and jealous of those that were.
    The "sending waves of men to their death" was Stalin's favorite tactic since the 1918 civil war.
    in 1918 already "…purged the military and food collection agencies of middle-class specialists,
    some of whom he also executed" <— great leader right there !
    He never forgot that humiliation of 1919, and eliminated all of those great Russian Generals that could have checked the German invasion.
    Heck , with those Russian commanders still alive the Germans might have never attacked USSR !
    But with that idiot in charge and all those suckers around him: who would throw away such an opportunity?
    How that psychopath of Stalin got to lead such a great Nation the Russians are , it blows my mind …

    Any way:
    You are putting too much trust in Aleksei Isaev, a suck-up to Father Stalin…
    "Unreasonable criticism of Stalin…In his books, Isaev defended Stalin's ass, as the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops and denies the accusations against him, which began to appear during the Khrushchev era. "
    Were the fuck is this Aleksei Isaev getting all that data , when ALL Soviet data of WW2 is still a Russian National secret ?
    but hey , gets cool videos on YT …

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  57. Thank you so much! Finally unbiased history , huge , major part of ww2 which was ignored for political reasons for decades….

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  58. Sounds an awful like it's a good reason that they blew up those tanks because if they didn't advancing Germans would have captured them and they
    Would have basically been giving the enemy replacement tanks

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  59. I think all the 4 powers suffered when it came to tanks; outdated designs; too many types of tanks and over engineered ones. Both Russia and Germany compared better in design but did not compare in war production to the British/ American system of mass production through the profit incentive, even if they had a head start on tank design which the allies were slow to catch up, 'A' tank is better than no tank.

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  60. For someone who became familiar with WWII warfare not least by playing cardboard counter boardgames in the 1980's, much of this doesn't really come as such a big surprise, and the need for armour, infantry and artillery to support each other is of course more like restating the obvious. For example, the state of many of the Soviet Mechanized Corps in 1941 was approximately covered already in such a massive wargame as "Fire in the East" (Game Designers Workshop, 1984), although the research at the time probably exaggarated Soviet readiness somewhat. Perhaps it might be more overwhelming to a later generation who got its primary knowledge of WWII combat from "World of Tanks", I don't know.
    I'd say the gist of this video sounds mostly right to me in explaining why the Russians failed so tremendously in 1941, but I have a hard time seeing how it could be an argument against superior German combat efficiency. What TIK does here is laying out the big factors of why the Russians were defeated in the early war, along with some novel items and interpretations, factors that still could be summed up in the following sentence: Unlike the Germans, they didn't have their shit together (but we already knew that). No one has ever doubted the quality of the Russian soldier as such, nor did the Germans on the eastern front at the time.
    As for "criticism", I'll only add a tidbit. Yes, the overwhelming numbers of Soviet tanks were light tanks in 1941 (mostly T-26's, then BT-5 and BT-7's, not to mention that a notable chunk of the "medium tanks" were outdated T-28's), but it shouldn't go unmentioned that the Germans had essentially ONLY light tanks as well, including the Czech built PzKpfw 38T, Panzer II's and even the PzKpfw I (still!). Even the 50mm armed Panzer III's carried a main armament (KwK 38 L/42) that lacked punch and were lightly armoured, and the comparatively few Panzer IV's in use were classified as infantry support tanks and carried a short 75mm gun that wasn't suitable in an anti-tank role. Same goes for the Sturmgeschutzes.

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  61. And everything you say completely contradicts the movie Fury, in which a company-sized german unit manages extremely difficult and with huge casualties to take out a single enemy medium tank that has been immobilized from the very beginning of the engagement and without any infantry, air or other support. Also this was set during the final days of the war when infantry anti-tank weaponry was significantly improved compared to 1941 and also 20% of the tank crew were fresh recruits with NO combat experience at all.

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  62. The Soviets not understanding Blitzkrieg does not diminish the value of their tanks in comparison to that of the Germans. While the lack of coordination on the Soviet side is a fact, the superiority of the Soviet tanks in both total and relative numbers, armament/mobility/armor and comparative quality equally remains a fact, nonetheless. Suggesting it just "is not a tank war" because the Soviets were incapable to use the actual tanks they had to anywhere near their full potential does not mean that the tanks didn't exist but "on paper". The one point you make does not rule out the other. In the end no single weapon type can win any war. This does not, however, change the reality of the order of battle. Had the Germans instead had this sort of equipment in numbers and quality and had they employed these according to Blitzkrieg military doctrine, Moscow would most certainly have fallen before the Winter of 1941.

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